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This article offers a novel account of the likely impact of new 
technologies—such as big data, algorithms, artificial intelligence, the 
blockchain, and smart contracts—on corporate governance. It shows that, 
contrary to common predictions, one of the most significant and immediate 
effects of these technologies on corporations concerns the distribution of 
competences and responsibilities among corporate bodies. The claim is 
supported by identifying five primary determinants of the current balance of 
powers in corporate organizations: (i) the speed and frequency of the 
decisions; (ii) the information necessary to decide and who has access to it; 
(iii) the costs of assigning decision-making responsibilities to a collegial 
body; (iv) the decision-makers’ incentives and interests; and (v) their 
competence and skills. Looking at whether and how these five dimensions 
are altered by technological innovation is the essential, and yet unexamined, 
analytical tool to accurately predict the impact of technology on corporate 
governance. While in some cases technological innovations may simply 
require managers to possess or acquire new competences and skills or may 
strengthen existing corporate roles, providing those who already make 
decisions with new tools to operate more efficiently, in other cases 
technology may shift the balance on who is the best decision-maker within 
the corporation. Technology may reduce some of the transaction costs that 
make collective decision-making burdensome for some corporate actors, 
suggesting, for example, that decisions that have been traditionally reserved 
for the board of directors may be made by shareholders. Similarly, 
competences that have commonly been delegated to executive officers and 
managers because of the need of particular operating expertise may shift 
back to the board of directors due to the informational decision-making 
support provided by technological tools. The result may not seem 
revolutionary at first glance, but it has potentially disruptive consequences 
for existing corporate governance models. 
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The relationship between business and technology has historically been 
very close. Every major period of economic development in the United 
States and abroad has coincided with one or more technological innovations, 
each readily embraced by the business community. From ancient times to the 
present day, applying these new discoveries to business has made progress 
possible. The steam engine, electricity,1 the telephone, the ATM machine,2 
and even the filing cabinet3 and the high-rise office block,4 which have 
immediate use in management, are famous examples of innovations that are 
commonly associated with periods of growth from the first industrial 
revolution to the economic boom and financialization of the twentieth 
century.  
Even though technologically induced socioeconomic changes have 
often been profound, there is reason to believe that the technologies of the 
twenty-first century will be even more disruptive than those past. The speed 
at which change seems to occur is one reason.5 Another is that big data, 
 
 * Bocconi University, Milan. I am indebted to Marco Cian and Claudia Sandei, who 
gave me the opportunity to present an earlier draft of this article, entitled The (Un)Predictable 
Impact of Technology on the Distribution of Corporate Powers and Responsibilities, at the 
international seminar “Corporate Strategy and Governance in the Digital Age” held on 
November 8, 2019, within the Ph.D. program in Legal Sciences of the University of Milan, 
and to the participants in the seminar for valuable inputs. I would also like to thank Luca 
Enriques, Mariateresa Maggiolino, Daniel Markovits, and Gabriele Nuzzo for helpful 
comments and conversations. All errors remain mine alone. 
 1. In a recent communication on the development and use of artificial intelligence in 
the European Union, the European Commission notably drew a parallel between the impact 
of the steam engine and electricity on past socio-industrial development and the possible 
effects of artificial intelligence on our society. See Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Artificial Intelligence for Europe, at 1, 
COM(2018) 237 final (Apr. 25, 2018). 
 2. See Douglas W. Arner, Janos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of Fintech: 
A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1271, 1274, 1279 (2016) (arguing that the 
invention of the ATM machine marks the beginning of modern Fintech).  
 3. Cf. Shelley Hayduk, From Filing Cabinets to Digital Thought, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 
15, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/03/from-filing-cabinets-to-
digital-thought/72490/. 
 4. See generally Gunter Gad & Deryck W. Holdsworth, Corporate Capitalism and the 
Emergence of the High-Rise Office Building, 8 URB. GEOGRAPHY 212 (1987) (examining the 
connection between the rise of corporate capitalism and the construction of high-rise office 
buildings in Toronto). 
 5. See Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 2, passim (emphasizing the speed of 
technological development and evolution in the context of FinTech). Note, however, that GDP 
growth and total factor productivity in the United States do not seem to support the conclusion 
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artificial intelligence, algorithms, blockchains, and smart contracts have far-
reaching consequences in many fields, including business strategy,6 
competition,7 the labor market,8 and even the democratic and political 
discourse.9 The Cambridge Analytica scandal, involving the unauthorized 
harvesting of personal data of Facebook users,10 showed how big data can be 
used to influence public opinion on political matters. Google and Amazon 
are modern-day champions of algorithmic profiling, providing personalized 
search results and purchase suggestions on the basis of previous online (and, 
thanks to the Internet of Things, even offline) customer behavior. Uber has 
made its fortune by being the first company in the transportation industry 
with no transportation means and, at least according to its management, no 
employees.11 Even more traditional manufacturing companies, such as 
BMW, are now trying to integrate big data and artificial intelligence into 
their business models.12 
From a corporate law perspective, a third and perhaps more compelling 
reason to consider twenty-first-century technologies disruptive is that they 
 
that the speed of innovation is currently at a historical high, although it might increase in the 
future. See VIJAY KUMAR & R.P. SUNDARRAJ, GLOBAL INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC VALUE 
84–88 (2018); MICHAEL GREENSTONE & ADAM LOONEY, A DOZEN ECONOMIC FACTS ABOUT 
INNOVATION 10 (2011), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/08_innova 
tion_greenstone_looney.pdf. See also Brishen Rogers, The Law & Political Economy of 
Workplace Technological Change, 55 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 531, 554–55 
(2020) (observing that current productivity statistics do not suggest high rates of automation). 
 6. See Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans & Avi Goldfarb, Artificial Intelligence in the 
Boardroom, 39 CORP. BOARD 16, 17–18 (2018). 
 7. See, e.g., MARIATERESA MAGGIOLINO, I BIG DATA E IL DIRITTO ANTITRUST (2018). 
 8. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and 
Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 257–58, 263–301 (2018); Rogers, supra note 5, at  
553–73. 
 9. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THEY DON’T REPRESENT US: RECLAIMING OUR DEMOCRACY 
67–136 (2019). 
 10. See Issie Lapowski, How Cambridge Analytica Sparked the Great Privacy 
Awakening, WIRED (Mar. 17, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/cambridge-
analytica-facebook-privacy-awakening/; Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and 
Facebook: The Scandal and the Fallout So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html. In the legal 
scholarship, see, e.g., Paul Przemysław Polański, Some thoughts on data portability in the 
aftermath of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, 7 J. EUR. CONSUMER & MKT. L. 141 (2018); 
Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Designing for Consent, 7 J. EUR. CONSUMER & MKT. L. 162, 163 (2018).  
 11. On Uber’s fissured workplace environment, see, e.g., Estlund, supra note 8, at 257, 
284–85; Rogers, supra note 5, at 571. 
 12. Bernard Marr, How BMW Uses Artificial Intelligence And Big Data To Design And 
Build Cars Of Tomorrow, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2017, 12:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
bernardmarr/2017/08/01/how-bmw-uses-artificial-intelligence-and-big-data-to-design-and-
build-cars-of-tomorrow/#5520d0eb2b91.  
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seem to support the long-awaited modernization of corporate organizations 
and to profoundly change firms’ inner workings. Over time, corporations 
have remained almost intact in their distinguishing features,13 which entail a 
body of investor-owners delegating management to one or more people 
sitting on a board.14 While mutual funds and other institutional investors 
helped introduce some changes in corporate governance, agency problems 
remain a well-known consequence of delegated management15 despite 
technological advances.16 Even the Internet—which made distance 
irrelevant, communications easy, and information widely accessible—did 
not bring about serious transformation. Even today, virtual shareholder 
meetings remain a distant possibility in many jurisdictions,17 while proxy 
and direct voting continue to present practical challenges, including ensuring 
proper shareholder identification and vote recording.18 Significantly, 
information readily available on the Internet has not even fully substituted 
paper documents and regular mail in corporate communications yet.19 
According to many commentators, this might soon change. Blockchain could 
revolutionize the way securities transactions are cleared and registered, 
ensuring specific shareholder identification as well as more transparency for 
corporate records and even virtual shareholder meetings.20 Artificial 
 
 13. See generally John Armour et al., What Is Corporate Law?, in REINIER KRAAKMAN 
ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1–
15 (3d ed. 2017) (identifying the common legal features of corporations across different 
jurisdictions). 
 14. Id. at 11–13. 
 15. Michael J. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976). 
 16. Cf. Luca Enriques & Dirk A. Zetzsche, Corporate Technologies and the Tech 
Nirvana Fallacy, HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript available as European Corporate 
Governance Institute (ECGI) Law Working Paper No. 457/2019, 2020), https://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3392321 (questioning, at 4, 7, whether algorithms and 
machines can improve monitoring on corporate agents). Cf. also Sergio Alberto Gramitto 
Ricci, Artificial Agents in Corporate Boardrooms, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 869, 877, 906 
(2020). 
 17. See Christoph Van der Elst & Anne Lafarre, Blockchain and the 21st Century Annual 
General Meeting, 14 EUR. COMPANY L. 167, 174 (2017) (observing that most E.U. members 
states do not allow virtual shareholder meetings); Dirk Zetzsche, Corporate Governance in 
Cyberspace—A Blueprint for Virtual Shareholder Meetings 27–28 (Heinrich Heine 
University Düsseldorf, Center for Business and Corporate Law Research Paper Series (CBC-
RPS) No. 0011, 2005), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=747347. 
 18. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate 
Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227 (2008); Christoph Van der Elst & Anne Lafarre, Blockchain and 
Smart Contracting for the Shareholder Community, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 111 (2019). 
 19. Cf. Zetzsche, supra note 17, at 16–21. 
 20. See infra Part I.D. 
4 - PICCIAU_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2020  1:00 PM 
Winter 2021] UNPREDITCABLE IMPACT 71 
 
intelligence could transform the way directors and officers make decisions 
in many different ways, from providing informational support to actually 
substituting them in whole or in part.21 More generally, common predictions 
for technology’s impact on corporations vary from forecasts of completely 
autonomous organizations, run entirely by algorithms,22 to more limited 
improvements and efficiencies in the workings of corporate bodies and 
procedures. But why should the new technologies bring about more dramatic 
changes than the technologies of the past? How realistic are these 
predictions? And what transformations can we actually expect in corporate 
governance?  
This article addresses these questions. It argues that, while the answer 
depends at least to some extent on the chosen time frame and on the specific 
technology considered, one of the most significant and immediate effects of 
the new technologies on corporations will concern the distribution of powers 
and responsibilities among corporate bodies.23  
The current distribution of powers is well known and fairly similar 
across jurisdictions. Shareholders vote on control-related and structural 
decisions, such as appointing and removing the company’s directors and 
approving mergers and liquidations. Directors, in turn, are responsible for 
making business decisions, such as whether to launch a new product or 
dismiss a supplier, but typically delegate day-to-day management to 
company executives and officers and retain policy-making and monitoring 
functions.  
Unlike past technological innovations, twenty-first century 
technologies have the potential to alter this balance. Particularly if used in 
conjunction with one another, they may decisively affect the determinants 
along which corporate law traditionally assigns power to various corporate 
constituencies.  
The article identifies five primary determinants of the current balance 
of powers in corporate organizations that concern which decisions must be 
made and how they should be settled. These determinants are (i) the speed 
and frequency of the decisions; (ii) the information necessary to decide (and 
who has access to it); (iii) the costs of assigning decision-making 
responsibilities to a collegial body; (iv) the decision-makers’ incentives and 
 
 21. See, e.g., Florian Möslein, Robots in the boardroom: artificial intelligence and 
corporate law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 649, 657–
66 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2019). 
 22. See infra Part I.E. 
 23. See David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, 21 REV. FIN. 7, 9 
(2017) (observing that the changes made possible by blockchains “could dramatically affect 
the balance of power between directors, managers and shareholders.”). 
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interests; and (v) their competence and skills. Looking at whether and how 
these five dimensions are altered by technological innovation is the essential, 
and yet unexamined, analytical tool to reliably and accurately predict the 
impact of technology on corporate governance. The main contribution of this 
article is, thus, to use these five factors to explain why and to what extent 
twenty-first century technologies may disrupt corporate organizations and 
governance. 
New technologies may, for instance, significantly reduce the 
transaction costs that make collective decision-making burdensome for some 
corporate actors, such as the shareholders, suggesting that decisions that 
have traditionally been reserved for the board of directors may instead be 
made by the shareholder meeting, in whole or in part. Similarly, 
responsibilities that have commonly been delegated to executive officers and 
managers because of their particular operating expertise may shift back to 
the board of directors due to the informational decision-making support 
provided by technological tools. Modern technologies may even change the 
ratio of company executives to non-executive employees, allowing the first 
to control and manage a higher number of production workers with fewer—
or possibly without any—middle managers, leading to significant changes in 
corporations’ organizational charts. More fundamentally, new technologies 
may strengthen existing corporate roles, providing those who already make 
decisions with new tools to operate more efficiently or, conversely, shift the 
balance on who is, in certain respects, the best decision-maker within the 
corporation. The result may not seem revolutionary at first glance, but it 
foreshadows potentially disruptive consequences for existing corporate 
governance models and demands renewed attention to ad hoc contractual 
solutions aimed at redesigning the roles of shareholders, directors, and 
managers on a case-by-case basis. 
Examining how technology alters the five dimensions listed above also 
enables us to appreciate the limits and constraints of technologically induced 
organizational change. For example, modern technologies do not provide 
competence and skills to those who do not have them; this remains a 
powerful theoretical limit to the scope of any conceivable reshuffle of 
corporate roles and functions. 
In this respect, the article builds on and implicitly supports one of the 
most basic claims of principal-cost theory24—namely, that competence 
considerations and costs play a fundamental role in determining a firm’s 
optimal governance structure. Principal-cost theory teaches that optimal 
 
 24. See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate 
Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767 (2017). 
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governance requires minimizing both principal and agent costs, which are 
the economic losses that either the principal or the agent produce when 
exercising control. These significantly include, among others, the cost of 
honest mistakes made by the principal due to lack of competence, expertise, 
information, or talent (the so-called “principal competence costs”); this is the 
main reason that most enterprises delegate tasks to management in the first 
place.25 Unless the principal has the necessary competence to run the 
business, it is “cheaper” to devolve it to management than to retain it.26  
Technology enthusiasts often claim that technological innovations such 
as blockchains and smart contracts will enable shareholders to assume direct 
control of the firm and will downsize or eliminate the need for directors and 
managers altogether. This article shows, however, that technology does very 
little, if anything, to reduce principal competence costs; this is why we 
should not expect radical changes in the current distribution of powers and 
responsibilities among corporate bodies, at least in the short term and with 
respect to most firms. While technology might strengthen the decision-
making and monitoring role of the shareholders vis-à-vis corporate directors 
and managers, competence acts as a fundamental limit to the extent to which 
shareholder empowerment in these two areas can take place. The article also 
demonstrates that competence and skill will continue to significantly 
characterize the role of corporate directors and managers even in the new 
technological era. Technology opens up opportunities and creates risks. 
Directors and managers will need to acquire new skills in order to exploit the 
former and understand and mitigate the latter. The creation of ad hoc internal 
tech departments and committees in charge of identifying and managing the 
unfolding possibilities and challenges of technological innovation will most 
likely follow suit. The overall result might be a stronger strategic and 
business role for corporate directors—that is, greater empowerment for those 
corporate constituencies who have, or could more easily acquire, the 
necessary competence to manage the business. 
As a final methodological note, in discussing the impact of technology 
on the five factors listed above, the article focuses on the relationship 
between shareholders, directors, and managers and does not address whether 
directors and managers should in their business choices also account for the 
interests of a broader spectrum of corporate stakeholders.27 The adoption of 
 
 25. The other reason is to reduce principal conflicts costs. See id. at 791–93, 802. 
 26. Id. at 770 (observing that “[t]o avoid such costs, [shareholders] delegate control to 
managers whom they expect will run the firm more competently”). 
 27. The origins of the discussion can be traced back to the beginning of the 1930s. 
Compare Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 
(1931) (arguing that corporate managers should put the interests of shareholders first), with 
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a stakeholder theory of corporate governance or of other approaches namely, 
the team production theory of corporate law and the director primacy view28 
could in fact implicitly set a constraint on the shift in power that could or 
should be achieved through technological innovation, favoring in any case 
greater managerial discretion.29 It remains true, however, that technology 
may also help empower (or disempower) different stakeholders, including 
customers, employees, suppliers, and local communities, in their interactions 
with the company.30  
 
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 
(1932) (contending that corporate managers should also consider the interests of other 
stakeholders). The dominant view has generally supported the shareholder primacy norm. 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 
439, 440–42 (2001). New interest in this debate resulted, however, from the increasing 
attention paid by institutional investors to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues 
and from a recent statement of the Business Roundtable which, contrary to previous policy 
positions, supported a broader conception of the corporate purpose that considers the needs 
of all stakeholders. Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation (Aug. 
19, 2019) https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/BRT-Sta 
tement-on-the-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-with-Signatures.pdf. On the reasons for such a 
change of heart by the Business Roundtable, see Mark J. Roe, Why Are America’s CEOs 
Talking About Stakeholder Capitalism Now?, OXFORD BUSINESS LAW BLOG (Nov. 7, 2019), 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2019/11/why-are-americas-ceos-talking-a 
bout-stakeholder-capitalism-now. 
 28. For a recent account of these different corporate governance models, see Ronald J. 
Gilson, From Corporate Law to Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 3, 15–22 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 
2018). 
 29. Unless one agrees with the claim that shareholders, and especially institutional 
investors, have an interest in environmental and social issues and should thus be the main 
advocates for stakeholder concerns. Cf. Marco Maugeri, «Pluralismo» e «monismo» nello 
scopo della s.p.a. (glosse a margine del dialogo a più voci sullo Statement della Business 
Roundtable), 2019 ORIZZONTI DEL DIRITTO COMMERCIALE 637. Cf. also Chiara Mosca & 
Chiara Picciau, Making Non-Financial Information Count: Accountability and Materiality in 
Sustainability Reporting, in FINANCE DURABLE ET DROIT: PERSPECTIVES COMPARÉES 175, 
181, 184–86 (Hugues Bouthinon-Dumas, Bénédicte François & Anne-Catherine Muller eds., 
2020) (arguing that the European lawmaker has tried to make institutional investors more 
attentive to sustainability and ESG matters). From this perspective, shareholder empowerment 
could also serve to protect stakeholder concerns, and the reasoning of this article, which 
focuses on the relationship between shareholders and managers, would not be significantly 
affected. 
 30. Blockchains could, for instance, increase transparency toward different stakeholder 
groups, and smart contracts could help administer contractual relationships between some 
stakeholders and the firm. On blockchains and smart contracts, see infra Parts I.C and I.D. 
More generally, platform-style businesses already encourage collaboration among different 
stakeholder groups. See Mark Fenwick, Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The 
End of ‘Corporate’ Governance: Hello ‘Platform’ Governance, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 
171, 172–73, 176, 193–94 (2019). 
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Against this background, the article proceeds as follows. Part I offers a 
brief overview of the technological tools and innovations that might affect 
twenty-first century corporations, such as big data, algorithms, artificial 
intelligence, blockchains, and smart contracts. Part II discusses the 
traditional distribution of powers and responsibilities among corporate 
bodies, identifying five criteria that help explain which corporate 
constituency—whether the shareholders, the board of directors, or the 
company executives—should make which decisions in the corporation’s 
organizational structure and why. Arguably, factors such as the costs of 
collective decision-making or the decision-maker’s incentives and skills help 
identify who should be in charge of a given decision, as well as the optimal 
allocation of responsibilities among corporate roles. Part III examines how 
new technologies may alter this balance—they have the potential to 
strengthen the deliberative role of the shareholder meeting by reducing the 
costs of collegial decision-making and enabling more efficient voting 
procedures. With the assistance of technological tools, the role of the board 
of directors might also change in fundamental respects, undertaking new 
responsibilities and benefiting from modern decision-making aids. Part IV 
develops three main policy recommendations that respond to the expected 
impact of technology on corporate roles and powers and argues that 
corporate law’s enabling nature must be preserved and strengthened to 
facilitate innovation. Part V summarizes the results of the analysis and 
concludes the article. 
 
I. TECHNOLOGY IN CORPORATE ORGANIZATIONS:  
FROM DIGITALIZATION TO AUTOMATION 
 
Even after the Internet connected the world, bridging distances for 
people and businesses, corporate roles remained almost unchanged. 
Shareholder meetings have continued to occur once a year. Their task still is 
to elect the company’s directors and to approve mergers, acquisitions, and 
other fundamental transactions (and, in certain jurisdictions, to vote on 
financial statements and the distribution of dividends). Even though the 
Internet made it easier to share information and communicate over long 
distances, shareholders of public corporations haven’t begun to meet more 
frequently or become more involved in corporate affairs. Despite being 
technically feasible, virtual shareholder meetings are rare.31 Electronic 
 
 31. Marie Clara Buellingen, Virtual Shareholder Meetings in the U.S., HARV. L. SCH. F. 
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 10, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/10/virtual-sha 
reholder-meetings-in-the-u-s/ (noting that “physical shareholder meetings remain, by far, the 
most common approach for U.S. companies”). 
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voting, either by proxy or directly, is common, but it usually continues to be 
connected with a physical assembly32 whose attendance rates remain low. 
What changed the most is probably the way corporations disseminate 
information to the market, both in preparation for the annual general meeting 
and during the financial year. Information is now readily available on 
company websites and on publicly accessible databases (such as EDGAR),33 
with the consequence that, at least for public corporations, shareholders have 
easy access to all relevant documents. Digital means have, however, not 
entirely substituted paper-based correspondence, and lawmakers have not 
truly encouraged the precise replication of shareholder meetings on virtual 
platforms,34 with some recent noteworthy exceptions due to the COVID-19 
pandemic.35 
The same is true with respect to the role of directors and managers. 
While internal communications and auditing systems have increasingly gone 
digital, core supervisory and managerial functions have been preserved. The 
board of directors maintains a monitoring and policy-making role vis-à-vis 
company executives, who are instead in charge of managing the day-to-day 
business. Although remote participation in board meetings has entered the 
routine, these gatherings continue to be held physically in many cases. 
Importantly, face-to-face meetings and phone conversations are still a very 
frequent form of private engagement between the company and its 
institutional investors or control shareholders, despite the increased 
availability of digital tools.36 
 
 32. With respect to Europe, see Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 18, at 121–23. 
 33. About EDGAR, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 
2020). 
 34. See Zetsche, supra note 17, at 13–28, 61. 
 35. For example, New York State Governor Andrew Cuomo recently issued an executive 
order temporarily suspending subsection (a) of Section 602 and subsections (a) and (b) of 
Section 605 of New York’s Business Corporation Law, which require shareholder meetings 
to be held and noticed at a physical location, thus enabling New York companies to hold 
virtual shareholder meetings. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 202.8 (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www. 
governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/EO_202.8.pdf. In the international 
landscape, Italy provides another interesting illustration of the recent greater openness of 
lawmakers to virtual shareholder meetings. See Decreto Legge 17 marzo 2020, n. 18, G.U. 
Mar. 17, 2020, n. 70, art. 106. 
 36. See, e.g., MARC GOLDSTEIN, DEFINING ENGAGEMENT: AN UPDATE ON THE EVOLVING 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHAREHOLDERS, DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVES. A STUDY CONDUCTED 
BY INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES FOR THE INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH 
CENTER INSTITUTE 13–15 (2014), https://www.weinberg.udel.edu/IIRCiResearchDocume 
nts/2015/09/engagement-between-corporations-and-investors-at-all-time-high1.pdf; Matteo 
Tonello & Matteo Gatti, Board-Shareholder Engagement Practices. Findings from a Survey 
of SEC-Registered Companies 14–15 (Dec. 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3503657; Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 18, at 124–25.  
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The impact of twentieth century technologies on corporations has thus 
involved a substantial, but not yet fully developed, digitalization of 
procedures and communications, which did not affect the role and 
responsibilities of the corporation’s constituent bodies. Shareholders, 
directors, and managers continue to do what they have always done, with the 
help of faster connections and more accessible information.  
The reason for this, even intuitively, is that twentieth-century 
technologies simply provided more efficient ways of doing the same things, 
without reducing directors’ dependence on managerial input and information 
or enabling effective shareholder empowerment. For example, they have not 
eliminated information asymmetries. Corporate management retained the 
power to decide what to disclose, to whom and when, although it could do 
so through faster and more efficient communication means. Similarly, 
twentieth-century technologies facilitated virtual shareholder meetings and 
greater shareholder participation, but they have not quite ensured tamper-
proof voting procedures, and have only marginally reduced collective 
decision-making costs. Shareholder identification, coordination, and voting 
remain troublesome, and information gathering and processing are still a 
costly endeavor for many investors.  
This article argues that the same is not true for certain recent 
technological innovations, which, despite being often analyzed and 
examined separately,37 build on one another in reshaping the role and 
functions of the corporation’s governing bodies. Recent research has 
typically addressed either how big data, algorithms and artificial intelligence 
may affect managerial decisions or, alternately, how blockchains and smart 
contracts may be employed to make shareholder meetings more efficient. 
Clearly, since artificial intelligence and algorithms, frequently working on 
big data, are decision-making tools, their most immediate application 
concerns those corporate constituencies—directors, officers, and 
managers—who usually make decisions. Similarly, since blockchains are 
distributed ledgers upon which computer programs may execute transactions 
(so-called “smart contracts”),38 their most immediate use concerns 
shareholder identification at corporate meetings, the recording of share 
transfers, and the administration of voting procedures. However, looking at 
the impact of each new technological tool in isolation risks missing the big 
 
 37. For a significant exception in the legal scholarship, see Enriques & Zetzsche, supra 
note 16. 
 38. See infra Part I.C. 
4 - PICCIAU_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2020  1:00 PM 
78 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1 
 
picture, as these technologies interact with one another and compound each 
other,39 potentially reshaping existing corporate roles and functions.  
Before delving deeper into the factors that should be employed to 
determine who should be in charge of a given decision within the corporation 
and how new technologies might affect this delicate balance, this Part 
describes the main technological innovations of the last decades in order to 
shed light on the unique features that make them suitable for application in 
business organization and governance. 
 
A. Big Data Analytics and the Platform Economy 
 
The expression “big data” refers to large databases of (unsorted) data, 
collected through technological and digital means, that are generally deemed 
valuable because of the knowledge that can be extracted from them.40 Big 
data vary in content, depending on how they were compiled, who controls 
the database, and why they were collected. They may, for example, include 
consumer browsing or shopping behavior on e-commerce websites acquired 
through Internet cookies, search histories, and other digital tools. They may 
comprise data on road traffic or driving habits, obtained through satellites, 
cameras, and car sensors. They may even encompass astronomical data, 
human genome data, or financial data.41 Classifications based on the content 
of the collected information are thus not particularly instructive or useful. 
The common element is that the data are obtained, stored, and analyzed, 
often at significant speed, through technological means and that they enable 
their user to obtain valuable knowledge.  
Interestingly, the knowledge that can be extracted from big data is not 
necessarily immediately obvious.42 Take the classical example of an e-
commerce website that records consumer searches and shopping choices. 
The data may reveal that a specific consumer prefers to read non-fiction or 
to wear silk blouses. It might also reveal other personal information that the 
consumer did not openly share, such as her age or income range, her political 
views, when she does most of her shopping (and presumably is not at work), 
and so on. Data analysis of online grocery shopping may allow one to infer, 
 
 39. See Mark Fenwick & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Technology and Corporate Governance. 
Blockchain, Crypto and Artificial Intelligence, 48 TEX. J. BUS. L. 1, 3–4 (2019). 
 40. See MAGGIOLINO, supra note 7, at 21, 28–31. See also JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN 
TRUTH AND POWER. THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 48–74 
(2019) (arguing that personal data are playing the role of raw materials in the information 
economy, constituting a new public domain: the “biopolitical public domain”). 
 41. MAGGIOLINO, supra note 7, at 30. 
 42. See id. 
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from the goods the consumer buys or does not buy anymore, whether she 
lives alone, is pregnant, is on a diet, has a health condition, might soon suffer 
from one, is assisting an elderly parent, and so forth. This enables companies 
to target marketing campaigns, offer personalized shopping suggestions, and 
adjust search results on the basis of what they expect the consumer will want 
to purchase in the future. In other words, big data enable businesses to create 
rather accurate consumer profiles and to reasonably predict consumer 
behavior. These predictions are, in turn, valuable for two reasons. They can 
be directly employed to offer customized services that are likely to be 
successful or they can be sold to third parties, allowing them to extract 
different, equally valuable knowledge from the same dataset.43 
Although big data are also gathered by public bodies, governmental 
agencies, and other entities for many different purposes, they are generally 
associated with Internet platforms such as Facebook or Amazon.44 Platforms 
are in a unique position to collect and exploit large amounts of data because 
users interact with them in a variety of ways. The more frequent and diverse 
these interactions are, the more opportunities the platform has to collect data. 
Facebook, for instance, has access to users’ personal information, “likes,” 
comments, posts, search histories, and much more. Amazon, Google, Uber, 
and other platform providers work in much the same way. They connect 
individuals and businesses, mediating communications and exchanges.45 In 
the process, they collect information on what these people say or do on the 
platform. As a result, although originally the term platform merely identified 
the technical base upon which computer programs ran,46 today platforms are 
complex infrastructures, built around networks47 that enable the collection 
and exploitation of what has been termed the “fourth factor of production”: 
“the data flows extracted from people.”48 
 
 43. See id. at 186–88 (describing data marketplaces). See also COHEN, supra note 40, at 
68–70. 
 44. See, e.g., Fenwick, McCahery & Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 174–78, 187–97 
(describing platforms, their business models, and what governance models based on a 
platform structure could look like). 
 45. See Mireille Hildebrandt, Primitives of Legal Protection in the Era of Data-Driven 
Platforms, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 252, 254–55 (2018) (drawing parallels between modern-day 
platforms, the Greek agora, and the Roman forum as spaces for market exchanges, political 
discourse, and other forms of expression). 
 46. Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of ‘Platforms’, 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 347, 351 
(2010); also cited by Hildebrandt, supra note 45, at 254. 
 47. Cf. COHEN, supra note 40, at 40–42 (on the difference between platforms and 
networks).  
 48. Id. at 38, 41. 
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The close link between big data and platforms is at the foundation of 
the so-called “platform economy” or “informational economy.”49 The model 
is fairly simple. Most of what happens on the Internet happens through 
platforms: communications, finance, transactions in goods and services, 
entertainment, social contacts, even employment.50 Platforms mediate and 
facilitate these relationships and interactions. In doing so, they have unique 
access to a pool of comprehensive and diverse data on each participant in the 
network that extends beyond the specific transaction or communication 
considered. In this respect, online environments and real-life situations have 
a major difference. A shopkeeper will, for example, focus on what customers 
like and buy, not so much on other details, such as at what time of the day a 
particular customer shops, how much time she spends in the shop, whether 
she is talking to someone while shopping, how often she shops, and so forth. 
In contrast, everything that we do on the Internet is tracked, recorded, and 
“surveilled,”51 representing potentially valuable information. The more 
activities we undertake in an online environment, the more information the 
owner of the platform can collect on our behavior. This is a powerful 
function: a platform can observe our online behavior in its entirety, measure 
all its relevant aspects, and then analyze the data to obtain valuable 
knowledge.  
The goal is to provide a stable point of mediation for the largest possible 
number of users, in order to have access to increasing amounts of analyzable 
data and eventually to substitute entire markets.52 One way through which 
this happens is by exploiting the data themselves to make users and 
customers rely on the platform. Social networks, for instance, often “test” 
user reactions by providing triggers and rewards that aim to induce recurrent 
behaviors. Big data and artificial intelligence are employed to find out what 
users like. This in turn is exploited to make the online experience more 
addictive, in a complex trigger-and-reward system that may even be used to 
affect user behavior.53 This mechanism has gained attention, especially in 
connection to its possible influence on elections and political discourse.54 
However, it also has important implications for the development of new 
 
 49. See id. passim (defining platforms as “the core organizational logic of the 
informational economy”). 
 50. See id. at 37. 
 51. See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE 
FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2018). 
 52. COHEN, supra note 40, at 42. Cf. Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 86–90 (2015) (describing Uber’s market-making function). 
 53. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 9, at 114–17, 122–23, 125, 192.  
 54. See id. at 119–22. 
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products, services, and markets more generally. Customer loyalty is, in fact, 
essentially obtained through network externalities and personalized services. 
 
B. Algorithms, Artificial Intelligence, and Machine Learning 
 
What spurred the rise of platforms and their business models? 
Widespread access to the Internet provides one piece of the puzzle, while 
improvements in hardware and software, which made it possible for 
computers to store and process large amounts of data, largely account for the 
remaining elements.55 However, the fundamental factors undoubtedly were 
the development of proprietary algorithms56 and artificial intelligence.57 
Platforms make considerable use of both in order to offer personalized 
services.  
In very broad terms, artificial intelligence is the ability of computers 
and other machines to behave in a way that appears “smart” or “intelligent” 
to an external observer.58 The technologies that enable this are different and 
many.59 Famous examples are decision-making programs that employ 
(proprietary) algorithms and machine learning.60  
Algorithms provide the technical tool to extract knowledge from a 
database. Although they are frequently used in connection with (large) 
 
 55. See Fenwick, McCahery & Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 187 (identifying 
improvements in hardware, connectivity, cloud-based storage systems for big data, and 
algorithms as the drivers of platform expansion). See generally ETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE 
LEARNING: THE NEW AI 1–7 (2016) (discussing computers’ increased ability to store and 
exchange data).  
 56. Cf. COHEN, supra note 40, at 45–46 (describing how platforms enable commercial 
counterparties, such as app developers and advertisers, to interact with potential customers 
without granting them access to the platform’s databases and algorithms). 
 57. See John Armour & Horst Eindenmüller, Self-Driving Corporations?, 10 HARV. BUS. 
L. REV. 87, 92–95 (2020) (on the origins and present state of artificial intelligence). 
 58. See id. at 92 (pointing out that the understanding of artificial intelligence as a 
machine that appears smart and intelligent, using as a basis for comparison the human 
intellect, has its origins in the work of Alan M. Turing. A machine passes the so-called 
“Turing test” if an interrogator, questioning a human and the machine without knowing who 
is what, would not be able to determine whether she is talking to a machine or a human based 
on their answers) (quoting from Alan M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 59 
MIND 433 (1950)). 
 59. See Möslein, supra note 21, at 655–56. 
 60. See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 90 (2014) 
(noting that the results of machine learning algorithms may appear “intelligent”). See 
generally Bernard Marr, What Is The Difference Between Artificial Intelligence and Machine 
Learning?, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2016, 2:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/ 
2016/12/06/what-is-the-difference-between-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning 
(distinguishing artificial intelligence from machine learning). 
4 - PICCIAU_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2020  1:00 PM 
82 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1 
 
datasets, algorithms are, in a strict sense, instructions that a computer uses to 
perform a task.61 Software programmers may explicitly formulate those 
instructions—for example, through coding. In these instances, human 
programmers tell the software what to do and how to do it, by spelling out in 
programming languages what inputs to use and how to process them. 
Machine learning represents a more sophisticated use of algorithms. In 
this case, the computer program is not given instructions on how to perform 
a task, but it is programmed to elaborate its own instructions by a complex 
trial-and-error procedure based on data.62 The data might be, as is often the 
case, “big data,” but this is not strictly necessary. Machine learning is in fact 
any learning activity autonomously performed by a computer program on a 
given set of data.63 The most successful machine learning programs so far 
are supervised learning programs64 that make use of deep learning 
techniques: a setup in which the data are analyzed in series through a process 
of abstraction and recalibration that should ideally resemble the thought 
process of the human brain.65 These programs are trained on a labeled dataset 
put together by flesh-and-blood programmers. On the training dataset, the 
computer identifies hidden patterns, rules, and consistencies that it later uses 
to create new instructions to perform on a new and unknown dataset the same 
task that was successfully executed on the training data. For example, 
programmers may train computers to provide translation services.66 In order 
to do so, they put together a training dataset that may include words and 
sentences in one language and their translations in another language. The 
programmers, however, do not give the program any grammar or syntax rule 
 
 61. ALPAYDIN, supra note 55, at 16. 
 62. See, e.g., id. at 16–17, 24–26; David H. Autor, Polanyi’s Paradox and the Shape of 
Employment Growth, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY: ECONOMIC POLICY 
SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS. REEVALUATING LABOR MARKET DYNAMICS 129, 158–62 (2015) 
(providing examples of how machine learning systems are programmed and work); Surden, 
supra note 60, at 90–95 (describing the main features of machine learning algorithms and 
providing an example of how they can automate spam email filtering). 
 63. See generally ALPAYDIN, supra note 55, at 17–54 (providing background information 
on what learning entails and how artificial intelligence makes use of statistics to “learn” and 
make predictions). 
 64. Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 95 (also pointing out that supervised 
learning programs are different from unsupervised and reinforcement learning systems. 
Unsupervised learning does not make use of labeled training datasets, while reinforcement 
learning only works by providing the system with a reward for identifying the correct answer. 
These two techniques have had some success, but far more limited applications.). 
 65. Id. at 93–95. See generally ALPAYDIN, supra note 55, at 85–109 (explaining how 
artificial neural networks and deep learning work). 
 66. Surden, supra note 60, at 99–100 (describing how machine learning tools for 
translation services work). 
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that the software should follow in delivering the translation.67 They simply 
evaluate the outcome. By telling the program whether the outcome of the 
translation was right or wrong, the program adjusts for future applications. 
In this sense, the machine autonomously “learns” which patterns and rules 
are hidden in the data and performs the task based on those consistencies. 
Curiously, while the rules that artificial intelligence programs might identify 
in a given dataset may not correspond to actual rules, the outcome is often 
still fairly correct.  
In the case of a translation, understanding what hidden patterns and 
rules the machine found is not of utmost importance, provided that, at least 
intuitively or implicitly, we know how different languages work and simply 
wish a computer program to replicate, as close as possible, what any human 
translator already does well. The ability to find hidden patterns, rules, and 
consistencies becomes, however, very important when we do not know what 
they are and how they work, but simply know they exist.68 It is precisely in 
this respect that machine learning, in conjunction with big data, offers the 
greatest innovation. Machine learning can be employed not only to replicate 
tasks that humans do well, but also to perform tasks that humans are not able 
to do accurately or at all because of their limited computing abilities or their 
insufficient understanding of the underlying processes and rules. A human 
observer may, for example, anticipate, based on experience, what another 
person would say or do in a certain situation but might not be able to 
accurately extend the prediction to other people or all situations. This is 
because there is a limit to the data and information that humans can acquire, 
store, and analyze at once. Moreover, while we have some knowledge of 
cognitive processes and biases, our understanding of human behavior is, in 
general, still flawed. This means that no programmer could teach a machine 
to read, interpret, and anticipate human behavior. It does not mean, however, 
that a machine could not learn to do this by itself, and the outcome won’t 
 
 67. This approach was actually tried by encoding grammatical rules in computer 
programs tasked to recognize and translate language, but the programs failed. Machine 
learning algorithms have instead provided much better results. Id. See generally Armour & 
Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 93 (observing that in the first stage of developing artificial 
intelligence, programmers attempted to feed programs with formal logic rules. This approach 
did not succeed due to the complexity of real-world problems and the difficulties in the 
deterministic calculation of all their possible outcomes). 
 68. See ALPAYDIN, supra note 55, at 14 (defining consumer “data mining” as a type of 
machine learning for which “[w]e do not know the rules (of customer behavior), so we cannot 
write the program, but the machine—that is, the computer—”learns” by extracting such rules 
from (customer transaction) data.”); Surden, supra note 60, at 107 (observing that machine 
learning can be used to discover “hidden relationships in existing data that may otherwise be 
difficult to detect.”). 
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necessarily be less accurate than when a real person performs such a 
calculation. Machines have greater storage and computing abilities, which 
enable them to “outsmart” their flesh-and-blood counterparts in situations 
where the underlying knowledge is murky, the data necessary to perform the 
task are vast, and speed of computing is key. By making use of these 
enhanced capabilities and working on large datasets, artificial intelligence 
improves our knowledge of the world, suggesting what hidden patterns and 
consistencies may hide behind an observed result. 
Importantly, the algorithms autonomously elaborated by machine 
learning software on the basis of data need not be—and often are not—fully 
understandable or transparent to human programmers to be of valuable 
commercial use.69 Only the result of the predictive or analytic activity must 
be. Thus, although machine learning is useful mostly in connection with 
tasks for which we know that there are hidden patterns or rules, it will not 
necessarily shed light on what these are and how they work. As a matter of 
fact, the rules that artificial intelligence programs identify in a given dataset 
not only may not correspond to actual rules, but they may never become fully 
distinguishable or comprehensible—yet artificial intelligence can still 
deliver accurate predictions. 
An example may help clarify the concept. Suppose that a restaurant 
chain wishes to know which dishes and drinks its customers are likely to 
order more often than not so as to revise its menu.70 The managers know that 
customer preferences change over time and depending on the location, but 
they do not know exactly what these preferences are. Indeed, while a single 
restaurant might be able to make rather accurate predictions, considering its 
limited customer base and particular location, a restaurant chain might 
encounter more difficulties. The task is, however, not hopeless, because 
“customer behavior is not completely random.”71 One might expect, for 
instance, that customers order more soup in the winter and more sorbets in 
the summer or that their drinking choices vary depending on the time of the 
year. There are, in other words,  
 
patterns in customer behavior, and this is where data comes in 
to play. Though we do not know the customer behavior patterns 
themselves, we expect to see them occurring in the collected data. If 
 
 69. See Rogers, supra note 5, at 558. 
 70. The example in the text adapts the example of the supermarket chain provided in 
ALPAYDIN, supra note 55, at 11–13. 
 71. Id. at 13. 
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we can find such patterns … we can make predictions based on 
them.72 
 
Better predictions enable, in turn, better business choices, increasing 
the profitability of those upholding them. Artificial intelligence helps 
precisely in making these predictions and, in some cases, directly makes 
decisions based upon them. It may show, for example, that customers in a 
particular location drink significantly more beer in the summer than in the 
winter or compared to other locations, although there is no apparent reason 
for this. The system may thus automatically change the menu in order to 
offer a wider or narrower choice of beer in different seasons or cities. 
Significantly, artificial intelligence users need not fully understand why 
customers in a specific location are particularly fond of beer to benefit from 
this indication. (Is it simply habit, a trend, loyalty to a locally handcrafted 
beer, or does beer just match well with the menu according to the prevalent 
taste of the people living in a specific area?). They can just adjust the menu. 
As the example suggests, machine learning applications, especially 
when based on big data, can produce knowledge that we do not already have 
and that might be of valuable commercial use. After all, any menu that 
accurately targets consumer preferences will fill restaurants and bars. This 
intuition is precisely what fueled the growth and expansion of online 
platforms such as Amazon and Google, which profit from accurately 
predicting consumer preferences and choices. Despite being an 
oversimplification of how big data, artificial intelligence, and machine 
learning work, the analysis above underscores a fundamental aspect of these 
new technologies. Their main output is a predictive activity that provides a 
valuable decision-making aid and that, in some instances, may even fully 
substitute human decision-makers.73 
 
C. Blockchain Technology and Smart Contracts 
 
Blockchains are distributed ledgers that record information in a manner 
that is sequential, unmodifiable, shared, and synchronized among 
participants.74 The original idea of a sequential reporting system was put 
forward in 1991 in order to ensure the certainty of intellectual property 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Möslein, supra note 21, at 656. 
 74. See, e.g., PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW 13–
57 (2018) (explaining the technology behind blockchains); Sinclair Davidson, Primavera De 
Filippi & Jason Potts, Blockchains and the economic institutions of capitalism, 14 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 639 (2018) (arguing that blockchains are an institutional innovation). 
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rights. Intellectual property rights were supposed to be time-stamped at their 
creation and then chained together through hash functions, a method of 
cryptography used to convert numbers of any length into fixed-length 
numbers.75 These given-length numbers, obtained solving a mathematical 
problem, are employed to univocally identify the underlying data in an easily 
verifiable way.  
The idea was later developed in order to create and manage the world-
famous virtual currency “Bitcoin.”76 Bitcoin transactions are, in fact, 
administered on a public blockchain. Participants are able to add blocks of 
transaction data, verify their integrity through a chain of hash functions, and 
then store a copy of the recordings. The term “blockchain” suggests that the 
transactions are bundled together in “blocks” and then chained with one 
another through cryptography. In the Bitcoin blockchain, so-called “miners” 
compete with each other to bundle transaction data and create new blocks. 
Each block is identified by a unique hash function and reflects “the contents 
of the previous block, which itself includes a hash function derived from its 
predecessor, and so forth, all the way back to the first block in the chain.”77 
More specifically, each new block contains transaction data, the previous 
hash, a time-stamp, and other data, the “nonce”: a random number, usually 
different for every miner, that enables the creation of a new hash.78 The 
fastest miner to come up with a valid hash function is rewarded with Bitcoins 
for having completed a block that other participants later verify and add to 
their copy of the blockchain.79 If any participant in the blockchain were to 
alter a block after it is formed and chained to others, its unique hash function 
would change in a readily identifiable manner and, as a consequence, all the 
hash functions associated with the subsequent blocks would be altered.80 
This ensures the integrity and certainty of the recordings for all participants 
in the blockchain.  
 
 75. Yermack, supra note 23, at 10–11. 
 76. The Bitcoin blockchain was developed from the idea of Satoshi Nakamoto (a 
developer whose real identity is still unknown), laid out in a famous white paper available 
online. See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2008), 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.  
 77. Yermack, supra note 23, at 11–12. 
 78. Id. at 13, 13 n.10. 
 79. See Daniel Ferreira, Jin Li & Radoslawa Nikolowa, Corporate Capture of 
Blockchain Governance (European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Finance Working 
Paper No. 593/2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3320437 (discussing 
the “proof-of-work” system, which enables decentralized record verification and governance 
on blockchains, as well as the risk of blockchain capture by the dominant mining equipment 
producer). 
 80. See, e.g., DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 25; Yermack, supra note 23, at 14. 
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A key component of the original blockchain idea was that the sequence 
of the recordings should be accessible to the public in order to prevent 
alterations and manipulations. In 1991, this could have been done by 
publishing the records in a newspaper or on another similar public source.81 
In the Bitcoin blockchain, it is ensured by opening the network to all 
interested parties, so that each party stores a copy of the blockchain on its 
hardware, and by employing a distributed and consensus-based mechanism 
to establish what is authentic.82 Indeed, one would have to control over half 
of the nodes in the network to tamper with existing records or to make fake 
ones; this is generally thought impossible due to the exceptionally high 
investment and computing power that it would require, at least for popular 
blockchains such as Bitcoin.83  
Blockchains may also be private or “permissioned.” This means that 
they are restricted to selected members and, in case of permissioned 
blockchains, they may be managed by a sponsor according to an agreement 
among the parties.84 The sponsor administers the network, has the power to 
admit new participants pursuant to the agreement, and verifies the 
transactions recorded on the distributed ledger. Permissioned blockchains 
offer some of the most promising uses of this technology for firms.85 
Corporations could, in fact, establish their own blockchain in order to 
register share ownership or for corporate accounting and reporting purposes. 
An additional feature of blockchain technology is that participants in 
the network can run smart contracts on it. Although there are many 
definitions of the term,86 a smart contract is essentially “a computerized 
transaction protocol that executes the term of a contract”:87 a set of 
 
 81. See Yermack, supra note 23, at 11. 
 82. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 23–24, 35–38. See also Enriques & 
Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 9–10 (explaining the difference between distributed ledgers and 
concentrated ledgers with respect to the risk of manipulation or corruption). 
 83. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 25, 113–14. 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 31–32; Yermack, supra note 23, at 12, 16; Jun Dai & Miklos A. 
Vasarhelyi, Toward Blockchain-Based Accounting and Assurance, 31 J. INFO. SYS. 5, 6–7 
(2017) (distinguishing between private and permissioned blockchains). 
 85. Cf. Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 18, at 127–29 (providing examples of how 
permissioned blockchains could be used for shareholder meetings and for the exercise of 
shareholder rights). 
 86. Riccardo de Caria, The Legal Meaning of Smart Contracts, 26 EUR. REV. OF PRIV. L. 
731, 734–35 (2019). 
 87. Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts, U. AMSTERDAM (1994), http://www.fon.hum. 
uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.
best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html. See also Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing 
Relationships on Public Networks, FIRST MONDAY (1997), https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/ 
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instructions that is automatically implemented when given conditions are 
verified. The terms of the agreement between the parties are written in code 
language, which a computer program automatically enforces. 
Imagine that two parties use a smart contract to execute a future on 
shares,88 agreeing that on a certain date, party A will transfer the ownership 
of 100 shares of Company X to party B, at a fixed price of $1,000. These 
instructions are embedded in a computer protocol (“coded”) in order to avoid 
intermediaries, enforcement costs, contract breaches, and other 
impediments. When the date arrives, the computer program will execute the 
instructions, transferring the shares from A to B and the money from B to A, 
without the need for any further action on their part or the intervention of 
any intermediary or enforcer. When smart contracts run on a blockchain, the 
parties exploit its network structure to make the transaction immutable and 
verifiable. In this case, each party uses its blockchain account to receive and 
make the transfers, which are then executed by a computer program directly 
on the network. The advantage, especially for public blockchains, is that the 
terms of the contract and its enforcement are distributed among many parties, 
which jointly record them, ensuring transaction certainty and immutability.89  
 
D. From the Digitalization of Corporate Reporting and Procedures … 
 
Blockchains and smart contracts, in their simplest version of coding 
instructions (such as “if A, then B”),90 may lead to a variety of corporate 
innovations, ranging from the digitalization of company reporting and 
procedures to more structural developments in the role and functioning of 
corporate bodies, especially the shareholder meeting.  
With respect to the first set of changes, blockchains and smart contracts 
could be employed to organize the internal accounting system of 
corporations and to automate corporate reporting.91 Business transactions 
with third parties could be recorded in real-time through private, 
permissioned or even public blockchains, which would ensure certainty and 
integrity of the recorded data, as well as access to, and verification by, all 
 
index.php/fm/article/view/548/469. For further discussion on smart contracts, see, e.g., Kevin 
Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313 (2017). 
 88. See generally DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 93–96 (discussing smart 
securities and derivatives). 
 89. See Dai & Vasarhelyi, supra note 84, at 7. 
 90. Cf. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 29. 
 91. See, e.g., Dai & Vasarhelyi, supra note 84, passim; Yermack, supra note 23, at 24–
26; Fiammetta S. Piazza, Bitcoin and the Blockchain as Possible Corporate Governance 
Tools: Strengths and Weaknesses, 5 PENN ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 262, 295–96 (2017). 
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(authorized) participants. Blockchain technology could improve tracking of 
internal accounting information, entrusting managers, auditors, and other 
chosen parties to validate recordings. Significantly, disclosure of accounting 
documents could be provided on a selective basis, grouping identified 
recipients in “aggregation levels” that would obtain access to predetermined 
parts of the blockchain depending on their role.92 Computer programs could 
then build accounting reports and financial statements based on the 
blockchain recordings in a traceable and verifiable manner. This system 
greatly reduces the risk of accounting manipulation, documentation error, 
and fraud93 by adopting a triple-entry accounting mechanism: Transactions 
are recorded by the two parties involved and by an independent intermediary, 
represented by (all the nodes in) the blockchain.94 The additional advantage 
compared to ordinary triple-entry accounting systems is that the blockchain 
effectively prevents tampering by third parties, including cyberattacks, given 
that the recorded transactions can hardly be modified or altered at a later 
date.95 
Blockchain-based accounting could also facilitate external auditing by 
specialized firms, as well as supervision by the competent governmental 
authorities, which could easily have or obtain access to the distributed 
ledger.96 Smart contracts could, for example, enable auditors to establish 
targeted controls on the recorded transactions. Business rules and accounting 
standards could likewise be encoded as smart contracts in a blockchain, 
facilitating internal monitoring and external auditing services, thus 
preventing possible violations from the outset.97 
 
 92. Dai & Vasarhelyi, supra note 84, at 6, 13. For more general observations on the 
possibility of granting selective access to the contents of a blockchain to certain authorized 
participants, see Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich Packin & Benjamin P. Edwards, Distributed 
Governance, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 1, 24 (2017). 
 93. But see Piazza, supra note 91, at 296 (arguing that companies could still circumvent 
reporting duties by maintaining a parallel system of accounting). 
 94. See Dai & Vasarhelyi, supra note 84, at 10–12 (discussing blockchain accounting). 
 95. Id. at 10. 
 96. Cf. id. at 13 (suggesting that smart contracts could be used to automate tax filings 
and provide continuous updates to the competent agencies). 
 97. Smart contracts could be used, for example, to confirm the balance sheet equation. 
In this case, “if the balance in the company account is set as the balance in the assets account 
less the total balance of the liabilities and equities account, then a smart contract could be 
created to monitor the balance of the company account, which issues alerts when the balance 
does not equal to zero.” Id. at 12 (also showing, at 12–16, how blockchains and smart contracts 
could help verify corporate recordings, enable automatic assurance systems, and modernize 
audits). See also DELOITTE, BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY. A GAME-CHANGER IN ACCOUNTING? 
3–4 (2016), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/de/Documents/Innovation/Blo 
ckchain_A%20game-changer%20in%20accounting.pdf. 
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Among other promising uses of blockchain technology is its application 
to shareholder meetings.98 According to many commentators, blockchains 
could successfully administer virtual shareholder meetings by tracing share 
transfers and identifying who is entitled to participate in the meeting and 
vote;99 registering proxies, voting instructions, and actual votes;100 ensuring 
that quorums and majority requirements are met;101 shedding light on empty 
voting practices;102 automatically preparing minutes of the meeting;103 and 
so forth. Essentially, each voter would be uniquely identified by her 
blockchain account and would have voting tokens that she could then 
allocate to express her preference for a specific ballot.104 This would readily 
 
 98. See, e.g., Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 17, at 172–76; Van der Elst & Lafarre, 
supra note 18, at 125–31; CSD WORKING GROUP ON DLT IN COLLABORATION WITH SWIFT, 
GENERAL MEETING PROXY VOTING ON DISTRIBUTED LEDGER (2017), https://www.issanet. 
org/e/pdf/2017-11_General_Meeting_Proxy_Voting_on_Distributed_Ledger_v2-1.pdf. 
 99. See, e.g., George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 
227, 254–70 (2018); Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 17, at 172–74; Fenwick & 
Vermeulen, supra note 39, at 8. Significantly, transfers of assets, including shares, have 
already been recorded on the Bitcoin blockchain through a method known as “colored coins.” 
Essentially, for each transfer the seller sends the buyer a trivial amount of Bitcoin together 
with a “token,” a piece of data identifying the asset that is actually being transferred. As the 
blockchain registers the transaction, it also registers the asset transfer. See also DE FILIPPI & 
WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 29–30; Yermack, supra note 23, at 16. More recently, several firms 
have been experimenting with blockchain-based securities clearance systems. For example, 
in August 2019, Securitize, a provider of blockchain-based platforms for token issuance, 
announced that it had been registered by the SEC as a transfer agent. This means that it can 
serve as the official keeper of records for the transfer of securities. See Press Release, 
Securitize becomes an SEC-registered transfer agent to modernize capital markets through 
blockchain, SECURITIZE (Aug. 21, 2019), https://staging.website.securitize.io/press/securitize-
becomes-an-sec-registered-transfer-agent-to-modernize-capital-markets-through-blockchain. 
 100. See, e.g., Yermack, supra note 23, at 23–24. For example, Broadridge Financial 
Solutions, Inc., a corporate services company, and ICJ, Inc., a joint venture of Broadridge and 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange, have developed and executed in a test environment a blockchain 
proxy-voting system designed specifically for the Japanese market; it mirrors traditional 
proxy voting but automates and simplifies it. See Press Release. ICJ and Broadridge Execute 
the First Blockchain-based Interoperable Proxy Voting Process in Japan, BROADRIDGE (Jan. 
14, 2019), https://www.broadridge.com/intl/press-release/2019/icj-and-broadridge-execute-
the-proxy-voting-process. 
 101. For example, through smart contracts running on blockchain. See BROADRIDGE, 
NEXT GENERATION PROXY VOTING. HOW DATA-DRIVEN ANALYTICS, OMNI-CHANNEL 
DELIVERY AND BLOCKCHAIN ARE HELPING MUTUAL FUNDS ACHIEVE THEIR PROXY GOALS 11 
(2018), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-next-generation-proxy-voting-
strategies.pdf. 
 102. See, e.g., Yermack, supra note 23, at 24; Geis, supra note 99, at 269. 
 103. For an example with respect to board meetings’ minutes, see Enriques & Zetzsche, 
supra note 16, at 11. 
 104. See, e.g., Yermack, supra note 23, at 23. 
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enable distant voting and ensure certainty in voter identification and vote 
counts. 
Clearly, blockchain technology is particularly suited to the most 
important function attributed to shareholder meetings: voting expression. 
Physical meetings, however, also perform other functions, including 
disseminating information and establishing a forum for participant 
discussion.105 Critics of virtual shareholder meetings have long claimed that 
only physical gatherings can effectively serve all of these purposes at 
once.106 This observation, however, does not apply, at least with the same 
strength, to blockchain-based shareholder meetings. Blockchains themselves 
may provide technical support in spreading information and enabling 
discussion, and they could even be supplemented by other devices, as simple 
as private platforms for communication, aimed at fostering dialogue among 
shareholders.107 The advantages of greater certainty in the administration of 
voting procedures must, in any case, be balanced with the shortcomings of 
current voting systems, which often do not even identify sure winners,108 and 
with shareholder absenteeism and rational apathy, which, especially in 
public corporations, suggest that the benefits of physical meetings might not 
be that important after all.109 
 
E. … to Autonomous Algorithmic Entities 
 
While blockchains and smart contracts promise to facilitate, digitalize, 
and improve corporate accounting and shareholder meetings, algorithms 
could help corporations make the transition to what has been called 
 
 105. See, e.g., Zetzsche, supra note 17, at 7–8, 13–14 (observing that shareholder 
meetings might also trigger a review of management’s activities). But see Van der Elst & 
Lafarre, supra note 17, at 167–71 (arguing that securities regulation and investor demands for 
information undermine the information function of the general meeting and that even the 
forum and decision-making functions are flawed in many respects); Van der Elst & Lafarre, 
supra note 18, at 122 (reporting that shareholders are not using the annual general meeting as 
a forum for discussion, since they mostly vote through distance voting mechanisms). 
 106. Cf. Ralph Simmonds, Why must we meet? Thinking about why shareholders meetings 
are required, 19 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 506 (2001); Elizabeth Boros, Virtual Shareholder 
Meetings, 3 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1 (2004). 
 107. See Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 17, at 175 (on the use of blockchain-based 
platforms as a digital forum for discussion); Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 18, at 128 
(also on blockchains as a discussion and communication tool). See also Zetsche, supra note 17, 
at 56–58 (proposing the use of “shareholder conferences” and chat boards for communications). 
 108. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 18, at 1248–70, 1279. 
 109. Cf. Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 17, at 175. 
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“algorithmic management”: Delegating the power to make business 
decisions to algorithms and other artificial intelligence tools.110  
The extent to which algorithmic management can affect legal entities’ 
decision-making processes may range from providing simple advisory 
services to directors and managers—for example, in the form of predictions, 
recommendations, and other information—to substituting one or more 
human decision-makers. Algorithms may easily supplant middle managers 
by setting work shifts, scheduling workers’ activities, assigning duties, and 
monitoring worker performance, as they do in certain gig economy 
companies, including Amazon and Uber.111 They could also conveniently 
replace corporate directors.112 As incredible as it may seem, this is already a 
reality. A venture capital firm from Hong Kong, Deep Knowledge Ventures, 
became famous in 2014 for having nominated a machine-learning algorithm 
to its board of directors. The algorithm, called “Validating Investment Tool 
for Advancing Life Science” (or “VITAL”), specializes in investment 
valuation and, even though it is technically not a board member, it has been 
given a vote on investment decisions.113 Other complex algorithms may be 
capable of making business recommendations and decisions on a more 
general basis. An example is IBM’s artificial intelligence program named 
“Watson,” which, despite its prohibitive cost, might be able to adapt its 
decisions to changing circumstances.114  
Although current technology seems relatively far from offering 
integrated applications for general corporate management,115 in the near 
future programmers might develop new machine learning algorithms that 
 
 110. The expression “algorithmic management” has also been used in a slightly narrower 
sense to signify “the use of data and algorithms to hire, direct, monitor, schedule, or discipline 
workers.” For this definition, see Rogers, supra note 5, at 535, 535 n.19. Rogers recalls that 
the expression seems to have become popular after being used in Ming Kyung Lee et al., 
Working with Machines: The Impact of Algorithmic and Data-Driven Management on Human 
Workers, in CHI 2015: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 33RD ANNUAL CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN 
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 1603, 1603 (2015), https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/ 
2702123.2702548. 
 111. See infra Part III.C.2.a. 
 112. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 113. Rob Wile, A Venture Capital Firm Just Named an Algorithm to Its Board of 
Directors: Here’s What It Actually Does, BUS. INSIDER (May 14, 2014, 1:19 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com.au/vital-named-to-board-2014-5; Jordyn Taylor, V.C. Firm 
Names Robot to Board of Directors, OBSERVER (May 13, 2014, 7:00 AM), https://observer. 
com/2014/05/v-c-firm-names-robot-to-board-of-directors. The case of VITAL has attracted a 
great deal of attention also in the legal scholarship. See, e.g., Martin Petrin, Corporate 
Management in the Age of AI, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 965, 966–68. 
 114. Lynn M. LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887, 900 (2018). 
 115. Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 107. 
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will be able to run simple and not-so-simple businesses at lower costs. One 
could easily imagine an algorithm that manages a vending machine 
business,116 ordering supplies online,117 tracking inventories, keeping its own 
accounting, and contracting for workers to periodically fill in the different 
automats. Algorithms could also conduct more complex businesses, such as 
a tour operator or a hotel. An algorithm could keep track of tourists’ requests, 
make bookings online, process payments, check availabilities, respond to 
complaints, and hire agents for all the other tasks that it cannot physically 
do.118 
As a result, some commentators have started to question whether such 
algorithms could actually control business entities with very limited or no 
human intervention or participation,119 such as algorithmic subsidiary 
companies that perform selected and narrow functions,120 which could be an 
intermediate step toward fully self-driving corporations and groups. The idea 
was first put forward by Shawn Bayern, who claimed that U.S. law would 
permit memberless entities exclusively managed and controlled by 
algorithms, de facto granting legal personhood to such autonomous 
systems.121 Legal constraints to this possibility could come from provisions 
prohibiting memberless entities or requiring that organizations be managed 
by natural persons.122 U.S. limited liability companies (LLC) would, 
however, be flexible enough to host autonomous systems. Default rules on 
boards of directors do not prevent algorithmic management and, according 
to Bayern, state law would also allow LLCs that become memberless over 
 
 116. The example of the vending machine is taken from Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, 
Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1485, 1494 
(2014). 
 117. Significantly, this task could be carried out with the help of a smart contract. DE 
FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 82–83. 
 118. See LoPucki, supra note 114, at 899. 
 119. Cf. id. at 897 (providing a definition of algorithmic control over an entity). 
 120. Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 106–07. 
 121. Bayern, supra note 116, at 1495–98; Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern 
Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 
96, 101–04 (2015). See generally Shawn Bayern et al., Company Law and Autonomous 
Systems: A Blueprint for Lawyers, Entrepreneurs, and Regulators, 9 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. 
L.J. 135 (2017) (discussing how autonomous systems could inhabit legal entities in different 
jurisdictions). See also DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 146–55 (on decentralized 
autonomous organizations running on blockchain). 
 122. See Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing 
Corporate Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1056, 1099–1101 (2014) (supporting, more 
generally, the reform of mandatory law provisions requiring that boards of directors be 
comprised of natural persons in order to permit firms to provide professional board services 
to corporations). 
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time to continue their operations, at least for a certain period of time, under 
the exclusive control of an artificially intelligent algorithm.123 Even if this 
did not occur, circular shareholdings could achieve a comparable result. A 
natural or legal person could establish two LLCs, company A and company 
B, both managed by an artificially intelligent algorithm. If company A were 
admitted as a member of company B and vice versa, the founder could 
withdraw from both companies, leaving them in the exclusive control of the 
autonomous system. In this way, the problem created by a prohibition on 
memberless entities would be avoided, since each company would 
technically have one member.124 According to other scholars, a similar result 
could be reached with other business entity forms and in different 
jurisdictions,125 taking advantage of the possibility to establish 
algorithmically controlled entities in countries where regulatory standards 
are low, since they could still do business elsewhere.126 De facto control 
could, in any case, be granted to algorithms by employing various 
expedients, such as contractual provisions delegating all decision-making 
powers to the algorithm127 or hiring complacent directors128 (if, for instance, 
local law required that the board be comprised of at least one or more natural 
persons). After all, algorithms already seem better than humans at making 
many decisions, including selecting prospective corporate directors.129 
For our purposes, the technicalities regarding how this result may be 
achieved in practice are not as important as the mere fact that the prospect of 
a legal entity entirely run and managed by an artificially intelligent algorithm 
is not so absurd or far-fetched. Leaving aside the accountability issues and 
policy concerns that autonomous algorithmic entities raise,130 the sole 
possibility of delegating management, in whole or in part, to an algorithm 
 
 123. Bayern, supra note 116, at 1496–97; Bayern, supra note 121, at 101–04. 
 124. Bayern, supra note 121, at 104 n.43. See LoPucki, supra note 114, at 898–99 
(contending that, while it is doubtful that LLC statutes permit memberless entities, circular 
shareholdings could achieve that result). 
 125. See LoPucki, supra note 114, at 907–12, 919–24; Bayern et al., supra note 121, at 
139–53. 
 126. Cf. LoPucki, supra note 114, at 926–28. 
 127. Bayern, supra note 121, at 99 (discussing the “process-agreement equivalence 
principle”). 
 128. LoPucki, supra note 114, at 913–18. 
 129. See Isil Erel et al., Selecting Directors Using Machine Learning (European Corporate 
Governance Institute (ECGI) Finance Working Paper No. 605/2019, 2020), https://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3144080 (showing that algorithms accurately predict 
director performance). 
 130. Cf. LoPucki, supra note 114, at 901–06 (arguing that algorithmic control may pose 
a threat, amplified by the fact that governments often do not meaningfully regulate the legal 
entities that algorithms could inhabit). 
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provokes compelling questions regarding the impact of new technologies on 
existing corporate roles and functions. Are these new technologies 
effectively going to deliver on their promise to fundamentally change how 
shareholders, directors, and managers interact with one another within the 
corporation? And will they effectively replace directors and managers? To 
answer these questions, it is crucial to understand the reasons that underlie 
the current assignment of powers and responsibilities among corporate 
bodies and to see if and how technology affects them. Parts II and III discuss 
these aspects. 
 
II. CORPORATE ROLES AND THE BEST DECISION-MAKER PROBLEM 
 
Although there is no widely accepted definition of the term, corporate 
governance refers to the way corporations are run131 and, more specifically, 
to their internal workings. It expresses a view that has taken hold since the 
1970s, according to which “the particular balance of power, organizational 
structure, and decision-making processes within the corporation matter 
deeply for economic and social life.”132 The emphasis is on the distribution 
of roles, powers, and competences within corporate organizations, as a way 
to spur corporate behavior toward desired economic and social ends. 
Especially over the last decades, stricter rules on board composition, 
independent directors, executive compensation, and so forth have been 
deployed as a panacea for all corporate problems. Legal reforms, however, 
are not the only determinants of corporate governance; they are, in a way, 
built upon other transformations, which indirectly contribute to affect the 
internal workings of corporations. The legal scholarship has, for instance, 
shown that the increased informativeness of stock market prices, together 
with the widespread adoption of the shareholder value maximization norm, 
made it possible to empower outsiders with monitoring functions, giving rise 
to the now ubiquitous board role of the independent director.133 Similarly, 
the growth of pension funds and institutional investors has encouraged 
 
 131. For a broad definition of corporate governance, comprising “everything that 
influences the way that a corporation is actually run” and/or that “exercises power over 
decision-making within a corporation,” see JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 2 (2008).  
 132. Mariana Pargendler, The Corporate Governance Obsession, 42 J. CORP. L. 359, 362–
63 (2016). See generally Gilson, supra note 28 (on the shift from corporate law to corporate 
governance that has taken hold since the 1970s). 
 133. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007). 
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greater shareholder empowerment134 through, for example, proxy access 
rules and increased disclosure. 
This article argues that new technologies have the potential to introduce 
similar changes in corporate governance by affecting one or more of the 
fundamental determinants along which corporate law typically distributes 
power between shareholders, directors, and managers. These include factors 
that relate to the way decisions must or should be made, such as the timing 
and frequency of the decisions, the availability of the necessary information, 
and the costs of deciding, as well as factors that are more deeply connected 
with the personal features of the decision-makers, such as their incentives, 
competence, and skills.135 
The distribution of power within corporate enterprises is not immutable, 
and corporate governance may be altered when transformations indicate that 
the best decision-maker on a certain matter has shifted. Shareholders might, 
for instance, have the best incentives to make a particular decision, but they 
may lack information or competence, and the costs of acquiring them may 
be prohibitively high. Accordingly, the optimal allocation of responsibilities 
might lie in assigning the decision to the board of directors or even to 
corporate officers, devising governance mechanisms that tie management’s 
incentives to shareholder preferences. If new factors were to lower these 
costs or make the necessary information or competence more accessible to 
the shareholders, the conclusion might change. It is, for example, no 
coincidence that the rise of highly competent institutional investors led to 
 
 134. See Brian R. Cheffins, The History of Corporate Governance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 46, 52–54 (Douglas Michael Wright et al. eds., 2013). 
 135. A theory of voting rights in (private) corporations has been put forward by Melvin 
A. Eisenberg, who offered a taxonomy of the factors that should be considered to determine 
which matters shareholders would expect to decide, as opposed to those that they would rather 
leave to management. The distinctions in the text draw from Eisenberg’s classifications. See 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern 
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1969). A conceptually similar way 
to look at the issue addressed in Part II is to ask which factors are relevant in establishing 
whether decision-making authority should be governed by a consensus-based system, 
assigning decision-making power to the organization’s constituents (such as the 
shareholders), or by authority and fiat, with a central decision-making body that has the power 
to bind the organization and its members (such as the board of directors, eventually operating 
through its officers). KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68-70 (1974). In this 
respect, the five factors identified in Part II also draw from the observation that “[t]he choice 
between consensus and authority is driven by three considerations: access to information, 
member interests and preferences, and severity of collective action problems.” Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, The Board of Directors, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE 275, 293 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018) (citing Arrow’s 
work). 
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calls for greater shareholder empowerment and, in the United States, to the 
declining influence of Delaware courts in regulating corporations.136 The 
reverse is, in any case, also possible. One could imagine that the growing 
complexity of certain decisions might lead to greater board involvement or 
to the rise of specialized corporate functions tasked with advisory, 
investigatory, or even decision-making powers, further removing 
shareholders from any significant deliberative capacity. 
Technology might be precisely the factor leading to such a reshuffling 
of corporate roles and functions. It has the potential to reduce information 
asymmetries and collective decision-making costs for shareholders, which 
have often justified a stronger role for management. It may also help align 
managerial behavior with shareholder preferences, enabling more direct 
shareholder control, or even require that managers acquire new competences 
and skills. Changes need not, and probably will not, be radical. Nevertheless, 
they will likely alter corporate governance as we know it. 
 
A. The Frequency and Timing of the Decisions 
 
Decision-making power within the corporation is distributed among “a 
board of directors, which manages the corporation’s business; officers, who, 
as agents of the board, execute its bidding; and shareholders, who elect the 
board” and decide on fundamental changes and transactions.137 In modern 
public corporations, the board of directors mostly performs a monitoring138 
and policy-making role in the interest of the shareholders, delegating 
operational decisions and day-to-day management to a team of appointed 
officers.139 It would, however, be a mistake to think that corporate directors’ 
deliberative capacity is necessarily sporadic or limited. The board’s 
 
 136. See Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 263 (2019). 
 137. Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 4. 
 138. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 162–70 (1976) 
(arguing that the board of directors is uniquely suited to monitor management). See also 
Gordon, supra note 133, at 1510–40 (discussing the changing role of corporate boards and 
the rise of independent directors and the monitoring board). 
 139. Policy-making here is meant broadly. Corporate directors often do not have the time 
and ability to craft or influence corporate strategy in the strict sense. See EISENBERG, supra 
note 138, at 139–48. However, they sometimes provide advice and counsel to company 
executives, are involved in certain fundamental decisions, such as mergers, and monitor the 
implementation of strategies and policies put in place by company executives and employees. 
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 135, at 277–79; Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 22. 
But see MACEY, supra note 131, at 51–68 (challenging the view that directors can at the same 
time effectively advise and monitor management, and discussing the possibility of board 
capture by management). 
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monitoring role entails important decision-making activities, such as 
nominating executive officers, setting their pay, and voting on major 
transactions.140 
This distribution of powers is, first and foremost, justified by the way 
certain decisions must be made. If decisions must be made frequently, 
directors and officers are in a better position than shareholders to make them. 
Officers may do so on a daily basis, devoting most of their efforts and time 
to the corporation. The board of directors, as the corporation’s monitoring 
and policy-making body, may also act relatively frequently.141 By contrast, 
especially in large publicly held corporations, shareholders do not have the 
time and are not interested in voting on routine matters. When decisions have 
to be taken swiftly or periodically, calling a meeting of the shareholders 
might bring undue delays and setbacks, which is why these decisions are 
usually left to officers and directors.142 
 
B. Asymmetries of Information 
 
Clearly, the frequency or speed at which certain decisions must be made 
cannot be the only relevant circumstance in deciding whether the 
shareholders have a legitimate expectation to a vote or whether the 
deliberation is, instead, better left to management. It is, however, an 
important factor that explains why (routine) business decisions—which 
typically require repeated action and speed, such as whether to buy a specific 
piece of machinery or what amount of raw material the company should buy 
from a particular supplier—by law fall within the powers of managers,143 
under the guidance and supervision of the board of directors. 
 
 140. EISENBERG, supra note 138, at 158–59, 162–65; Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 
122, at 1053. See Bainbridge, supra note 135, at 283–84 (arguing that the board of directors 
also performs a managerial function, because even though it reviews proposals made by 
management it has ultimate responsibility on a variety of basic corporate decisions). 
 141. This aspect should not be overstated. Board meetings occur more frequently than 
shareholder meetings, but still a few times a year, which makes it impossible for the board to 
actually manage the corporation. See EISENBERG, supra note 138, at 141–43. See also Petrin, 
supra note 113, at 973, 975; Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 122, at 1061, 1064–65. It 
is nevertheless significant that board meetings can be convened more easily than shareholder 
meetings, if need be. Moreover, the time that directors devote to board service seems to have 
increased in recent years. Bainbridge, supra note 135, at 319, 327. 
 142. See, e.g., Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 17, at 168, 170 (observing that the need 
to provide relevant information to the shareholders before the meeting and the corresponding 
notice requirements make it impractical to convene the shareholder meeting for actions that 
have to be taken swiftly). 
 143. Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 10–11. 
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Other related reasons concern the availability of the relevant 
information and, more generally, the costs of collective decision-making.144 
Those who are more directly involved in managing the corporation have 
greater access to information on company operations, which makes them 
suited to make choices on a daily basis. This does not mean that corporations 
could not devise disclosure mechanisms aimed at bringing shareholders up 
to speed. There are, however, compelling reasons not to do so in all 
circumstances, as well as some practical hurdles. Greater disclosure to a 
larger number of people might raise, for instance, insider trading concerns. 
It may also hamper the prospects of closing a deal, if information is 
circulated too early. This suggests that even assuming that parity of 
information between shareholders and managers were feasible, it might not 
be desirable. The resulting asymmetry of information justifies, in turn, a 
greater decision-making role for corporate management.145 
 
C. The Costs of Collective Decision-Making 
 
Large corporate bodies, as shareholder meetings tend to be, also incur 
significant decision-making costs; the cost of circulating information on the 
subject matter of the decision, typically covered by the corporation, is only 
a part of these costs. They include the cost of obtaining information on other 
shareholders’ voting intentions, communicating among shareholders, and 
coordinating voting behavior in the general meeting.146 The greater the 
number of shareholders, the higher these costs are likely to be.147 
Furthermore, collective action itself entails the risk (and thus the cost) of 
reaching inefficient decisions,148 which increases with the heterogeneity of 
the preferences (and possibly the number) of the people involved in the 
deliberation, as voting outcomes tend to reflect the preferences of the median 
 
 144. See generally Armour et al., supra note 13, at 11–12 (on the information and 
coordination costs of shareholder meetings). 
 145. Significantly, the availability of information is one of the factors that contribute to 
determine shareholder voting efficiency. Michael C. Schouten, The Mechanisms of Voting 
Efficiency, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 763, 780–81. 
 146. See Zetzsche, supra note 17, at 38–39 (describing the costs of exercising shareholder 
rights). See generally HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 41–42 (1996) (on 
the “costs of the collective choice process”). 
 147. Because the number of the communication channels among shareholders also 
increases. See Bainbridge, supra note 135, at 302. 
 148. See generally Schouten, supra note 145 (identifying the four mechanisms—informed 
voting, rational voting, independent voting, and sincere voting—that determine shareholder 
voting efficiency). 
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voter instead of those of the average voter.149 Finally, the average voter could 
also be wrong.150 The result is that (large) shareholder meetings entail higher 
decision-making costs than board meetings or single officers, suggesting that 
on ordinary matters directors and officers are in fact the best-decision makers 




Another way of looking at how power should be split among corporate 
bodies is to ask who has the best incentive to decide or who is less prone to 
opportunistic behaviors and conflicts of interest. For instance, stockholders 
are said to have the best incentives to decide on structural decisions, such as 
mergers or liquidations, because their investment is at stake.151 In contrast, 
directors might oppose these decisions, especially if they know or expect that 
they will lose their jobs afterward. Directors also have distorted incentives 
when it comes to control decisions, such as the appointment and removal of 
board members, changes in voting rules (e.g., the introduction and regulation 
of cumulative voting or slate voting), resolutions on the information flows to 
stockholders, and so forth.152 Structural and control decisions are not taken 
frequently and are usually considered and examined over long time spans,153 
enabling the corporation to provide shareholders with the necessary 
information and to engage the shareholder meeting in the deliberation. 
Incentives complete the picture, identifying which party might be more self-
interested in the specific matter or has, instead, the best motivation to 
consider the issue. 
To be sure, incentives are never clear-cut and thus are seldom decisive 
for the law. Consider a charter amendment that introduces a class of 
preferred stock with enhanced financial rights or a new common stock issue. 
Both changes might have an impact on the value of the preexisting common 
stock and affect controlling interests within the corporation, which suggests 
 
 149. HANSMANN, supra note 146, at 39–41. See Schouten, supra note 145, at 802–05 
(explaining how heterogenous preferences may lead to conflicted voting and thus to insincere 
voting, which undermines voting efficiency). See also Bainbridge, supra note 135, at 293–94 
(on shareholders’ heterogenous preferences). 
 150. The average voter could, in fact, prefer a non-value-maximizing decision. Cf. 
Schouten, supra note 145, at 780. 
 151. Cf. Randall S. Thomas & Paul H. Edelman, The theory and practice of corporate 
voting at US public companies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 459, 467 
(Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015). 
 152. See Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 13 (from whom the examples in the text are also 
drawn). 
 153. See id. (with respect to structural decisions). 
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that shareholders ought to vote on them.154 In fact, directors could promote 
changes in the company’s capital structure to favor certain shareholders to 
the detriment of others, depending on who would be more eager to support 
their re-election at the next ballot. However, shareholders might also have 
distorted incentives. They may oppose these changes despite the 
corporation’s need for additional capital in order not to see their financial 
rights comparatively diminished or their stakes diluted. In contrast, corporate 
directors could be motivated by the need to provide the company with 
necessary financial resources and, thus, by a legitimate business concern.  
This is why different legal systems devise solutions that, even for 
structural and control decisions, involve to a certain extent both directors and 
shareholders. In the examples outlined above, U.S. law grants shareholders 
the power to amend the articles of incorporation, while the board of directors 
generally retains the power to propose such amendments. The board of 
directors may issue new shares, but only within the limits set forth by the 
law and the corporate charter itself, and thus by the shareholders.155 In civil 
law systems, this balance may be reached in different ways, but it also 
ordinarily requires action by both of the aforementioned corporate 
constituencies. For example, in the European Union, new issues of stock are 
subject to a vote in the shareholder meeting, but the board of directors may 
be authorized in the corporation’s charter or by the shareholder meeting to 
issue new stock within the limits specified in the authorization.156 The same 
is true for mergers. Both in the United States and in Europe, mergers require 
the approval of the board of directors and the shareholders, which each 
contribute, in different roles and capacities, to the positive outcome of the 
transaction. The board of directors and its officers negotiate and approve the 
terms of the merger, making sure that the shareholders receive fair 
consideration for their ownership interest in the merged enterprise. In turn, 
shareholders have the final say on the deal, which generally entails an 
amendment to the company’s governing documents.157 
 
 154. See Thomas & Edelman, supra note 151, at 467 (arguing that shareholders should 
vote on issues that relate to, or might have an impact on, the stock price or firm value). 
 155. Edward Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, in REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 171, 177, 180–
81 (3d ed. 2017). Notably, U.S. case law held that the board of directors may not issue stock 
for the purpose of reallocating control. Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 144. This constraint aims 
at preventing opportunistic behaviors. Without it, corporate directors could be tempted to alter 
the capital structure of the corporation in order to grant control to indulgent shareholders. 
 156. Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 
2017 relating to certain aspects of company law, 2017 O.J. (L 169) 46, art. 68. See also Rock 
et al., supra note 155, at 181. 
 157. Cf. Rock et al., supra note 155, at 183–85. 
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E. Competence and Skills 
 
Interestingly, shared competence of the shareholders and the board may 
also be understood, if not in terms of incentives, by looking at the skills that 
are involved in deliberations.158 To this end, scholars have distinguished 
between investment skills and business skills.159 Shareholders are commonly 
assumed to have the first (or to be able to easily acquire them by hiring an 
investment advisor), while directors and officers have the latter. After all, the 
very reason shareholders hire managers is that managers “can run a business 
more competently than they can, thereby increasing firm value.”160 
Accordingly, when a decision involves investment skills, shareholders 
should be entrusted with the power to make it, while when only business 
skills are at stake, the decision should rest with the board of directors and its 
officers. This distinction has, for instance, been invoked to justify, on a 
theoretical level, why shareholders should vote on a merger or a company 
liquidation. The idea is that  
 
the skills involved in formulating a decision to merge with 
Corporation B or to liquidate Corporation B are similar to the skills 
involved in formulating a decision to invest in Corporation B, and 
quite different from the skills needed to formulate an advertising 
campaign, conduct employee relations, or make steel. Management 
may or may not have the skill to make such decisions. On the other 
hand, shareholders … normally will have such skills, even though 
they may be unequipped to make ordinary or extraordinary business 
decisions.161 
 
Upon closer investigation, however, corporate decisions rarely involve 
only one set of skills. Shareholders of company A, which is about to merge 
with company B, may be better equipped to evaluate whether company B is 
a good investment. The board of directors is, nevertheless, a better judge of 
 
 158. Principal-cost theory underscores that competence is a fundamental determinant in 
the allocation of control rights within firms. See Goshen & Squire, supra note 24, passim. 
 159. Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 10. 
 160. Goshen & Squire, supra note 24, at 785 (also noting that competence is, indeed, “[a] 
more compelling explanation for the separation of ownership and control” than, for instance, 
the need to aggregate capital from different investors). As a matter of fact, competence also 
explains why even wholly owned firms, for which aggregation of capital is not an issue, 
delegate management to a professional body. Id. at 769–70, 772, 780. 
 161. Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 12–13. Accord Rock et al., supra note 155, at 174. The 
excerpt included in the text refers to shareholders in privately held corporations, but the same 
considerations remain valid for publicly held companies as well. 
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the synergies, economies of scale or scope, and other similar efficiencies that 
may arise as a result of the merger. Consequently, the law commonly 
preserves a key role for the board of directors (and its officers) in negotiating 
and closing such transactions, despite giving decisive weight to the vote of 
the shareholder meeting.  
Moreover, while some investors, such as hedge funds and other activist 
institutional investors, may also be well-equipped to make or advise on 
business decisions, other investors may not even have basic investment skills 
and may need to acquire them—for example, by investing in a fund managed 
by a professional management company or by hiring a third-party specialist 
such as an investment consultant. Reality is, as always, more complex than 
its depictions, but the fundamental distinction between investment skills and 
business skills helps stress the fact that in large corporations, investors and 
managers tend to “specialize” in their respective roles. 
In short, the law distributes power among corporate bodies based on 
considerations that concern what decisions must be made and how, including 
(i) the speed and frequency of the decisions; (i) the information necessary to 
decide and who has access to it; (iii) the costs inherent in assigning decision-
making responsibilities to a collegial body;162 (iv) the decision-makers’ 
incentives and interests; (v) their competence and skills. These 
considerations often point at a specific corporate role as the best decision-
maker. Just as often, they justify shared competence and responsibility.  
 
F. Monitoring and Decision-Making 
 
The five factors identified above prove just as important in 
understanding the allocation of monitoring responsibilities, which also 
involve decision-making duties. The board of directors monitors 
management on behalf of the shareholders and, in carrying out this activity, 
makes the crucial decision of appointing and removing key company 
executives. Significantly, the board chooses the chief executive officer163 and 
decides on executive compensation, which shapes executives’ incentives in 
running the business.  
 
 162. Note that the overall cost of collective decision-making may also depend upon the 
speed and frequency of the decisions and the need to disseminate information. As a 
consequence, considerations regarding points (i)–(iii) of the list in the text may partly overlap 
in practice. 
 163. EISENBERG, supra note 138, at 162–65, 162 n.88 (also observing that besides 
selecting and dismissing the members of the chief executive’s office, the board is generally 
entrusted with the task of choosing other major officers and, at times, also minor officers). 
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It is easy to see why the board is entrusted with this task. Selecting key 
executives does not need to be done on a daily basis or within a short time 
frame, but the board’s costs of collegial decision-making are relatively low 
compared to the shareholder meeting. The information that is necessary to 
decide on an appointment is often readily available to the board and does not 
depend on having close and direct involvement in the business. Most 
importantly, board members have the necessary skills to evaluate candidates 
and make the selection, provided that they too often serve or have served as 
executives for other companies.164 Similar considerations apply in dismissal 
decisions. Consider the competence and knowledge required to assess 
whether low performance is the result of excessive risk-taking or, 
conversely, whether high performance is mainly obtained by sacrificing 
necessary investments.165 Corporate directors seem better equipped than 
shareholders to make the decision. One could thus very well say that the 
shareholders hire the board to select and dismiss the chief executive officer 
and the other executives because company directors are expected to make a 
more competent choice than them. 
More broadly, time availability, the frequency with which monitoring 
should occur, the coordination costs among principals (which grow with the 
number of principals involved),166 the expertise and skills necessary to 
evaluate agents’ actions, and the incentives to take corrective measures are 
all circumstances that determine who should be in charge of supervision. All 
of these factors explain why the board’s monitoring role is, or should be, 
more pervasive than shareholders’ direct monitoring and why directors are 
usually said to monitor corporate management “on behalf of” the 
shareholders. Provided that shareholders do not have the time, desire, and 
often expertise to monitor corporate management directly,167 in modern 
corporations the board of directors serves as a check on managerial action in 
the interest of the shareholders. Directors have greater access to relevant 
information, including inside information, and sit on a board that ensures 
more compact, agile, and smooth decision-making. They have the expertise 
and skill to evaluate and understand corporate performance, and they might 
even have comparatively better incentives to monitor the business, due to 
 
 164. On all these aspects, id. at 163–64. 
 165. Cf. id. at 165. 
 166. See John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and 
Legal Strategies, in REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 29, 30 (3d ed. 2017). 
 167. Bainbridge, supra note 135, at 280. See EISENBERG, supra note 138, at 167. 
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reputational constrains and compensation mechanisms that are tied to stock 
price performance.168 
To be sure, shareholders perform some monitoring functions as well, 
which are assisted by the power to appoint and remove the members of the 
board and by the right to cast their vote on executive compensation, although 
in an advisory capacity.169 However, they naturally play a more modest role 
than corporate directors. This is mainly because, as opposed to the board, 
they typically do not have the skill and information to evaluate 
management’s business decisions and strategies. They do have an 
instrument, the stock price, to evaluate whether management is running the 
business in accordance with their interests, but this only implies that for them 
the “monitoring decision” ultimately comes down to whether the investment 
is still sound or not.170 
 
III. THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF CORPORATE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
This Part examines the likely effect of twenty-first-century technologies 
on corporate governance, arguing that while their impact may be substantial, 
it is not free of constraints. Big data, algorithms, artificial intelligence, 
blockchains, and smart contracts may, to various extents, alter the five 
aforementioned determinants of corporate governance. Technology thus 
might, on its own, induce some changes in the distribution of powers and 
responsibilities among corporate constituencies. However, several 
constraints—including mandatory corporate law—play an important role in 
enabling more radical transformations. 
The combined effect of the new technologies on the five factors 
discussed in Part II can be summarized as follows. Generally, these 
technologies enable more frequent and timely decisions, reduce information 
asymmetries, and curtail the costs of collective decision-making. They 
facilitate fast and secure communications and interactions. Accordingly, 
even those corporate bodies, such as the board of directors and the 
 
 168. Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 21. See EISENBERG, supra note 138, at 162–
70 (arguing that the board is particularly suited to monitor management). 
 169. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010). 
 170. Cf. Thomas & Edelman, supra note 151, at 462–63 (arguing that shareholders are the 
only constituency whose sole certainty of returns is directly tied to changes in the stock price, 
and that the vote is “almost uniquely useful in providing the shareholders with the ability to 
monitor the board to insure it protects” their interest to maximize the residual value of the 
firm as reflected in the stock price). 
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shareholder meeting, that are not involved in activities that require repeated 
or speedy action could become more engaged in corporate affairs. This is 
particularly true for the board of directors, as shareholders might still not 
have the time to or be interested in taking part in many corporate decisions.  
The new technologies also help reduce asymmetries of information and 
extricate communications from corporate management’s exclusive control. 
Blockchains and smart contracts could, for instance, make corporate 
documents and data more readily available to shareholders and directors, 
while at the same time preserving the integrity and authenticity of the 
information. Technology could therefore contribute to make shareholders 
and the board more informed about management’s conduct, with potential 
repercussions on the allocation of monitoring responsibilities. 
Faster and more secure exchanges via blockchain could also greatly 
reduce the costs of collective decision-making. Unlike other previous 
technologies, blockchains ensure tamper-proof communications, the 
certainty of recordings, and a safe platform for sharing data and information. 
These advantages are particularly important for the shareholder meeting, 
which typically incurs in high decision-making costs due to the large number 
of participants. A limit to the possible improvements in the functioning of 
the shareholder meeting is, however, that technology cannot homogenize 
shareholders’ preferences, whose heterogeneity conversely raises collective 
decision-making costs. 
On the whole, the impact of the new technologies on the first three 
dimensions along which corporate law typically distributes power (i.e., the 
speed and frequency of the decisions; the information necessary to decide 
and who has access to it; and the costs of collective decision-making) seems 
to lead to greater shareholder empowerment by facilitating access to 
information, communications, and voting. Some constraints are, however, 
immediately apparent. First, despite the possibility of acquiring a more 
prominent role within the corporation, shareholders might still not be 
interested in greater engagement. Second, collective decision-making costs 
can only be reduced through technology, not eliminated. A radical 
transformation of the role of shareholders is, thus, improbable. In contrast, 
the board of directors might come out strengthened by the adoption of new 
technologies, benefiting from wider access to company information, less 
reliance on information flows originating from executive officers, and 
greater speed and security in communications. Notably, the two constraints 
that limit shareholder empowerment do not really apply to the board. 
The other two factors that corporate law considers when allocating 
power among corporate constituenciesnamely, incentives and competence 
or skillspoint in the same direction and actually cast further doubt on the 
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scope and likelihood of technology-enabled shareholder empowerment. 
Technology does not affect incentives. It cannot make directors and 
managers less interested in keeping their jobs, nor does it alter shareholder 
preferences and motivations. Moreover, technological innovations 
supplement competence and expertise, but they hardly provide these skills 
to those who lack them. At most, they provide information or 
recommendations to people who already know how to make appropriate use 
of both. Incentives and competence will thus continue to shape the 
distribution of power within corporate enterprises to a non-negligible extent, 
further limiting the magnitude of the changes that technology can produce in 
this respect. 
Against this general background, this Part examines in greater detail 
how we can expect the role of shareholders, directors, and managers to 
change following the widespread adoption of twenty-first-century 
technologies. Section A addresses the increased ability of shareholders to 
obtain information, communicate among themselves, and engage in direct 
monitoring, reducing agency costs and potentially downsizing the board’s 
monitoring role. Section B discusses the likelihood of more direct 
“shareholder democracy” and the ensuing possibility that shareholders 
become involved in business decisions, arguing that competence represents 
a significant constraint to enabling direct shareholder democracy in practice. 
Section C analyzes the changing role of corporate directors and managers 
and contends that the board might come out strengthened in its decision-
making role, to the detriment of lower-level decision-makers.  
Clearly, a broad and logically foregoing potential limit to 
technologically induced change is the very adoption of new technologies by 
corporations, which rests in the hands of directors and especially 
managers.171 Some of these constituencies might have an incentive to “fight 
back” against this process or to use technology to further their own 
interests.172 For the sake of the analysis, however, Part III assumes that 
corporations will implement new technologies in their organizations to their 






 171. Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 44. 
 172. See id. at 7–8, 31, 42 (arguing that as long as management continues to control the 
code selection and design process, technology will further its interests within the firm). 
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A. Shareholders in the Twenty-First Century: Agency Problems and 
Monitoring 
 
While management often mediates exchanges among shareholders and 
between shareholders and the corporation by deciding which information 
should be communicated, to whom, and how, the board of directors serves 
an intermediary role by monitoring management on behalf of the 
shareholders. A first set of issues concerns whether with the advent of new 
technologies corporate management and the board will lose their 
intermediary function and, in particular, whether shareholders will take over 
or downsize the board’s monitoring of executive officers and managers by 
engaging in more direct supervision.173 
 
1. The Limited Disintermediation of Information Sharing within the 
Corporation 
 
Corporate management operates as an information intermediary.174 
When shareholders want to provide information to other shareholders in 
preparation for a meeting, they must go through the corporation and thus 
through corporate management. Shareholder petitions to the corporation are 
typically forwarded by management; this offers directors and officers the 
opportunity to consider each issue in advance and provide a response.175 
Significantly, it is the corporation (and, indirectly, the shareholders) 
providing the resources in these cases, even when information flows 
originate not from the shareholders but from directors that wish to obtain 
proxies. 
These constraints might be justified by the need to ensure integrity, 
parity, and comprehensiveness of information to the benefit of all 
shareholders, by corporate secrecy reasons, and by the drawbacks of 
previous technologies. Older technologies automate procedures and 
safeguard electronic exchanges only imperfectly, and the risk of inaccuracies 
and tampering while using them remains high. Consequently, although law 
reforms facilitated direct shareholder communication and distant voting, 
with some noteworthy exceptions they did not come close to displacing 
 
 173. Id. at 15–20, 33–42 (presenting and discussing the “board disintermediation 
hypothesis”). 
 174. Zetzsche, supra note 17, at 32. 
 175. See id. See also MACEY, supra note 131, at 201 (observing that “[b]efore an issue 
even gets to the shareholders for approval, it must almost always first pass through the board 
of directors for its approval.”). 
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managers from their intermediary role or to allowing fully virtual 
shareholder meetings.  
The obstacles outlined above might now be partly overcome through 
blockchains and smart contracts. These technological advances guarantee 
safer communications and traceable information dissemination, more 
accurate reporting on corporate matters and events, time-stamping of 
relevant documents, increased certainty and traceability of corporate actions, 
and integrity of accounting records.176 As a result, they are likely to 
downgrade management’s intermediary function and encourage more direct 
interaction and communication among shareholders and between 
shareholders and the corporation. Different corporate departments could, for 
instance, give the shareholders direct access to relevant documents, and 
shareholder petitions, proposals, proxies and other communications could 
also be forwarded through blockchains, ensuring parity of information to all 
authorized participants without the need for management’s mediation. 
Corporate management is, however, still likely to maintain an 
intermediary function for two reasons. First, management intervention is 
needed to verify that shareholders only access the platform for lawful 
purposes and communications, as well as to ensure the accuracy and 
comprehensiveness of corporate information made available through the 
blockchain. There might still be some justification for having management 
establish whether shared information originating from within the corporation 
contains relevant, comprehensive, and truthful data. Second, even if it 
becomes feasible to grant broad access to corporate documents and 
information without the risk of tampering, hacking, or other manipulation, it 
might not be desirable or sensible. There is, for example, an enduring need 
for having management filter confidential corporate information, news, or 
documents that, if made public, could harm the company’s interests.177 Most 
importantly, indiscriminate access to all corporate documents, even if not 
strictly confidential, could hamper the day-to-day management of the 
corporation and create excessive hurdles for directors and officers.  
The most likely advantage of using blockchains and smart contracts to 
circle information will thus not so much concern the scope or breadth of the 
disclosure, but rather its timeliness, integrity, and traceability and, to a 
greater extent, the increased ability of shareholders to share proposals, 
petitions, and similar communications in a more direct fashion, limiting 
corporate directors’ and officers’ advantage of advance consideration.  
 
 
 176. See supra Part I.D. 
 177. See Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 34–35. 
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2. Direct Shareholder Monitoring and the False Promise of Board 
Disintermediation 
 
Blockchains and smart contracts are also likely to induce more active 
shareholder monitoring of the conduct of senior management and other 
company employees.178 If technology enables secure document transfers, 
safe and traceable access to corporate records, and integrity and time-
stamping of relevant information, shareholders might demand to obtain more 
direct knowledge of corporate affairs, relying less on the board’s 
supervision. This might, in turn, foster shareholder activism and even 
litigation.179 For example, blockchains and smart contracts could make 
“executive compensation more easily traceable and quantifiable” for 
investors,180 causing shareholders to challenge preexisting compensation 
arrangements and practices more often than in the past. 
Despite these changes, however, there is reason to doubt that 
corporations will give up the board structure altogether or otherwise strip 
boards of their monitoring role.181 Monitoring and policy-making activities 
require time availability, which shareholders might not have, and frequent 
engagement, which shareholders might not be willing to undertake.182 More 
importantly, they also require business competence and skill, which 
shareholders typically lack. It is no coincidence that directors’ expertise 
usually mirrors corporate functions (e.g., accounting, compliance) or the 
areas in which the company operates (e.g., financial services, oil and gas, 
investments). This is because monitoring agents requires an expert 
understanding of what the agents do and why they do it; absent such an 
understanding, shareholders might not be fit for the task.  
Technology will not fundamentally change this. Blockchains are not 
useful for enhancing or providing expertise to those who don’t have it and, 
to be sure, nor are big data and artificial intelligence. Blockchains may help 
spread information and documents, but they certainly do not provide the 
 
 178. Cf. Assaf Hamdani et al., Technological Progress and the Future of the Corporation, 
6(s1) J. BRIT. ACAD. 215, 217, 229–30 (2018) (pointing out that new technologies reduce 
monitoring costs). 
 179. See Zetzsche, supra note 17, at 41 (observing that “[t]o the … extent that information, 
communication, voting, and review become less expensive, we should expect shareholder 
activism to rise.”). 
 180. Piazza, supra note 91, at 290. On the use of new technologies for executive 
compensation arrangements, see  Hamdani et al., supra note 178, at 217, 229; Enriques & 
Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 11–12, 15. 
 181. See Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 33–42. 
 182. See id. at 35–37 (arguing that passive institutional investors will likely continue to 
be rationally reticent). 
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training or expertise that is often required to judge and act upon the 
information contained in those documents. By the same token, big data and 
artificial intelligence provide valuable information, advice, and 
recommendations; however, these are still inputs that require competence to 
be interpreted, understood, and utilized for decision-making purposes. 
Artificial intelligence needs experts, or at least competent users, to express 
its full potential. Consequently, while technology may enable more effective 
monitoring, it cannot substitute the expertise that monitoring functions often 
require. Making these instruments available to the shareholders does not 
equate to providing them with the required knowledge, competence, and 
expertise. We should thus expect that shareholders will continue to rely to a 
significant extent on corporate boards for monitoring. 
 
B. Shareholder Empowerment in Business Matters: Lessons from the 
DAO Case 
 
A second issue is whether new technologies will promote greater 
shareholder involvement in business or even enable fully decentralized 
organizations that function under a direct democracy principle—that is, 
without executives or managers.183 As anticipated, shareholders typically 
vote on control and structural decisions, while business decisions are left to 
the board of directors and its agents. Twenty-first-century innovations, 
however, facilitate virtual shareholder meetings, potentially leading to 
shareholder empowerment in business.  
Technology will foreseeably allow more frequent and engaged 
shareholder voting by reducing the costs of collective decision-making.184 
Thanks to improvements in cryptography, blockchains and smart contracts 
provide a secure tool to share documents and information, trace share 
transfers, identify who is entitled to participate and vote in shareholder 
meetings, register proxies and votes, and check compliance with quorums 
and majority requirements.185 To be sure, technology does not eliminate all 
the costs inherent in assigning decision-making responsibilities to a collegial 
body; factors such as the numerosity and heterogeneity of the preferences of 
the body’s members are likewise crucial.186 Even if information 
dissemination and voting procedures become more efficient, the risk (and 
cost) of reaching inefficient decisions thus remains to some extent, 
particularly for public companies with a large shareholder base. However, if 
 
 183. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 137. 
 184. Van der Elst & Lafarre, supra note 17, at 176. 
 185. See supra Part I.D. 
 186. See HANSMANN, supra note 146, at 39–40. 
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communication means and voting procedures are speedy and secure, they are 
likely to be used more often. More voting opportunities could, in turn, entail 
more power for the shareholders in business decisions.187 Even though the 
tasks of shareholder meetings are ordinarily established by law, often 
through mandatory provisions, contract law could introduce some 
adjustments. The corporation’s governing documents could, for instance, 
provide for enhanced powers to initiate or demand board action or establish 
shareholder authorizations and advisory votes on business matters, without 
this necessarily being a violation of corporate law mandatory provisions.188 
For their part, directors and officers might even welcome greater shareholder 
involvement in business decisions, using it as an argument in support of their 
choices in case of liability risk. Even if these authorizations and votes were 
not binding, one can indeed expect corporate management to pay attention 
to them and conform its actions to their outcome, simply by way of moral 
suasion. 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that technology will tip the scales in favor 
of empowering shareholders in business affairs. New technologies do very 
little to alter shareholder incentives or to supplement or enhance shareholder 
competence and skills, and this remains a powerful theoretical limit to 
completely depriving directors and managers of their role. 
The case of The Decentralized Autonomous Organization (The 
DAO),189 which is often put forward to illustrate how direct shareholder 
democracy could work in practice through technology,190 is instead a 
powerful example of the shortcomings and limits of this idea.  
 
 187. See, e.g., DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 134 (arguing that “the cost of 
soliciting shareholder input could decrease to the point where it would become economically 
feasible for shareholders to assume a greater role in the management of organizations.”); 
Yermack, supra note 23, at 23; Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 18. 
 188. Possible reforms concern the legal limits to shareholder influence that currently exist 
in many jurisdictions, including procedural barriers to shareholder petitions or the provision 
of a minimum share threshold to exercise shareholder rights, which have often been justified 
by the cost of shareholder voting and engagement. See generally Zetzsche, supra note 17, at 
40. However, these limits are likely to remain in some form, as they are typically also intended 
to avoid obstructionist behaviors on the part of minority shareholders. 
 189. See, e.g., Werbach & Cornell, supra note 87, at 350–52; Fenwick & Vermeulen, 
supra note 39, at 10. See generally DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 101–02, 136–55 
(on decentralized organizations and The DAO). 
 190. See, e.g., Reyes, Geslevich Packin & Edwards, supra note 92, at 4–5 (defining The 
DAO as a “leaderless, decentralized venture capital firm” that substituted “code for the 
directors and officers,” and arguing, more generally, at 19, that “DLT [distributed ledger 
technology] enables business governance structures that are more transparent, more flat, and 
more participatory,” operating “without a centralized authority or agency.”). 
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The DAO was an unincorporated organization run on blockchain 
technology that ceased operations after having been the victim of a 
cyberattack and being investigated in the United States by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) for violating public offering rules.191 Even 
though blockchains are said to prevent cyberattacks and to produce 
immutable records that cannot be modified at a later date, The DAO shows 
that this statement is not absolute, but subject to exceptions under rare 
circumstances.192 For our purposes, however, The DAO is an interesting 
illustration of the extent to which new technologies can actually promote 
greater investor empowerment (keeping in mind, however, that The DAO 
did not adopt the corporate form and therefore, mandatory corporate law 
provisions did not apply to it). 
In 2016, The DAO sold a large amount of DAO tokens on the Ethereum 
blockchain193 in exchange for a virtual currency named “Ether” for a total 
value corresponding to approximately $150 million. The DAO was “pure 
code,” managed by German corporation Slock.it. The founder and chief 
technology officer of Slock.it described The DAO as a code programmed to 
entirely “automate organizational governance and decision-making.”194 
Significantly, The DAO’s website specified that the organization existed 
“simultaneously nowhere and everywhere … operating solely with the 
steadfast iron will of unstoppable code.”195 Essentially, The DAO raised 
funds on a blockchain by receiving virtual currency in return for its tokens. 
The organization’s main purpose was to invest these funds in projects 
brought by contractors. Investors holding DAO tokens were entitled to vote 
on the contract proposals and shared the “rewards” if the projects were 
profitable. All voting procedures and corporate governance arrangements 
were written into code and automated using smart contract technology.196 
 
 191. A description of The DAO and the results of the investigation are set out in an SEC 
report. Report of Investigation, Exchange Act Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017). 
 192. For a description of the cyberattack and of the following events, when participants 
in the blockchain managed to “reverse” the hack and obtain the stolen cryptocurrencies back, 
see, e.g., id. at 9–10. 
 193. On the Ethereum blockchain, see, e.g., DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 27–29. 
 194. Christoph Jentzsch, Decentralized Autonomous Organization to Automate 
Governance Final Draft—Under Review 1, https://lawofthelevel.lexblogplatformthree. 
com/wp-content/uploads/sites/187/2017/07/WhitePaper-1.pdf (last accessed July 4, 2020). 
 195. Since The DAO’s website is no longer available, the quoted sentence is taken from 
the report of the SEC, which mentions the content of the website. SEC Release No. 81207, 
supra note 191, at 5. 
 196. Id. at 4–6. 
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Interestingly, The DAO’s website included a messaging platform where 
invited participants could discuss the organization among themselves.197 
Contractors could submit project proposals to the organization by writing a 
smart contract, the details of which were published on the blockchain. They 
usually also provided additional information on their proposal on The 
DAO’s website. The funds raised by The DAO were used to fund the 
contractors’ proposals, provided that they obtained a majority of the votes of 
DAO token holders. As ordinarily happens for business organizations, the 
vote of each participant was weighed against the total number of tokens held, 
in order to ensure proportionality. Not all proposals, however, were put to a 
vote. A group of people chosen by Slock.it, known as the “curators,” were 
in charge of reviewing the proposals and selecting those that were promising 
enough to be voted upon. The curators also performed a more general 
security function, checking, for example, whether the project proposals came 
from identifiable sources and whether their smart contracts were properly 
written, which proved important when The DAO came under attack.198 
During the attack, funds were drained from the organization’s Ethereum 
blockchain address to another address in the same blockchain belonging to 
the hacker. The organization’s code managed to freeze the amount deposited 
in that account for a certain number of days, during which the investors and 
the curators rewrote the software detailing the rules of the blockchain (the 
“Ethereum protocol”) and transferred the stolen Ethers to a recovery 
address.199 
Due perhaps to the attention that the cyberattack brought upon The 
DAO, the SEC initiated an investigation, which ascertained that the DAO 
tokens were securities and that, as a result, the organization should have 
registered them before offering them to the public, absent an applicable 
exemption.200 Among the factors that the SEC considered in making the 
 
 197. Id. at 5. 
 198. On how project proposals were selected and put to a vote and on the role of the 
curators, see id. at 6–8. 
 199. Id. at 9. Essentially, the curators and the investors enforced a “hard fork,” which 
happens when a majority of participants in a blockchain change the protocol without the 
consent of all members. This gives rise to a separate chain of blocks, regulated by a different 
protocol, that shares with the original blockchain some blocks but splits after a certain point 
in order to enforce new rules. The fork is “hard” when the new rules of the blockchain, and 
thus the new path taken by it, are incompatible with the original ones. In The DAO case, the 
hard fork transferred the funds originally raised by the organization, including the stolen ones, 
to a recovery address. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 24, 188–89 (defining forks 
as the split of a blockchain in multiple copies due to different causes, and describing The 
DAO’s hard fork); Reyes, Geslevich Packin & Edwards, supra note 92, at 6–7 (also on The 
DAO’s hard fork). 
 200. SEC Release No. 81207, supra note 191, at 16. 
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determination,201 special attention was given to the significant role assigned 
to Slock.it and the curators in running the organization. Despite the claim 
that The DAO was managed entirely by code and in a completely automated 
fashion, the curators’ efforts were deemed essential to the success of the 
enterprise. Not only did they decide which proposals were put to an investor 
vote (this included proposals to remove the curators from their office), but 
they also vetted contractors, presented themselves as experts, and helped 
investors recover from the cyberattack.202 In short, even though investors had 
the final say on the investments that the organization made, the curators 
behaved and acted as managers, in an entity that resembled in many respects 
an investment fund run by a management team. 
The continued need for a management team by an organization that was 
purportedly operated “solely with the steadfast iron will of unstoppable 
code” is particularly significant in understanding the impact of twenty-first-
century technologies on corporate governance. It shows that, in all 
likelihood, shareholders will continue to expect a professional managerial 
body to undertake some management functions and that direct shareholder 
democracy is far from becoming a reality. 
Besides mandatory corporate law constraints, one reason for this is that 
shareholders might still not have sufficient time or the desire to decide on all 
(business) matters,203 preferring to be in charge only of certain important 
decisions. In fact, while The DAO’s investors held the ultimate 
responsibility for all investment decisions, they benefited from the vetting 
and prescreening activity performed by the curators, which permitted them 
to focus exclusively on the most deserving projects.  
Another perhaps more compelling reason is that technology does not 
help much in providing business competence and skills to those who don’t 
have them.204 It can solely help them obtain information, which is not quite 
the same thing. The DAO case was peculiar in this respect: The distinction 
between investment and business skills was not that relevant, because the 
 
 201. The SEC applied the “Howey test,” established by the Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. 
Howey, Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) in order to determine whether a contract is an investment 
contract and thus a security under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. According to 
the test, a contract is an investment contract if it concerns: (i) an investment of money; (ii) in 
a common enterprise; (iii) in expectation of profits; (iv) solely from the efforts of a third party. 
The last element of the test underscores that, in order to qualify as an investment contract (and 
thus as a security), the investment’s returns must depend on the managerial efforts of a third 
party. 
 202. SEC Release No. 81207, supra note 191, at 12–13. 
 203. See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 74, at 139–40. See also Reyes, Geslevich 
Packin & Edwards, supra note 92, at 26–27. 
 204. But cf. Zetzsche, supra note 17, at 42. 
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business decisions that The DAO had to make were, in essence, investment 
decisions—that is, whether or not to put money in a certain project. This 
circumstance alone allowed greater investor empowerment than what could 
be expected in other scenarios. Indeed, since business and investment 
decisions almost coincided, The DAO’s investors generally had the skills to 
make (all) business decisions. This is not usually the case, though. In a 
corporate setting, even though shareholders may demand greater 
involvement in business matters, they are still likely to opt for some form of 
delegated management. After all, as The DAO and the investment fund 
industry show, even when business decisions entail investment skills, a 
managerial team may serve a useful purpose.  
This conclusion can be theoretically explained and understood by 
resorting to principal-cost theory.205 Recall that both principals and agents 
incur competence and conflict costs when exercising control and that optimal 
governance requires minimizing the sum of all control costs. Competence 
costs are the costs of honest mistakes due to lack of expertise, skill, or talent. 
Meanwhile, conflict costs result from self-seeking behaviors and from 
monitoring efforts that are put in place to limit or prevent such conduct.206 
Principal costs are the main reason that management is usually delegated. 
They also reveal why investors will continue to “delegate control instead of 
sharing it collectively,”207 even in the blockchain era. Under normal 
circumstances, shareholders will not be able to competently (or cost 
efficiently) run the business and will hire professional managers instead.  
Even when investors have the competence and skill to make business 
decisions, because they overlap with investment decisions as in The DAO 
case or for other reasons (and thus principal competence costs are low or 
zero), delegating some decision-making responsibilities to a professional 
body might, however, still reduce total control costs. Think of the curators’ 
pre-screening activity of potential investments. Delegating control to the 
curators presumably cut down the DAO token holders’ conflict costs—
namely, the costs of self-seeking behaviors and conflicts that may arise 
among investors due to the heterogeneity of their preferences.208 Thus, one 
 
 205. Goshen & Squire, supra note 24. 
 206. Id. at 784. 
 207. Id. at 781. Significantly, when principals are numerous, principal competence costs 
tend to be higher because any effort made by each principal to make an informed contribution 
to collective decision-making will most likely be duplicative. See id. at 788. 
 208. See id. at 791–93. Principal conflict costs seem to largely, if not entirely, overlap 
with the costs that in this article have been identified as collective decision-making costs. 
According to Goshen and Squire, principal conflict costs are one of the main reasons why 
corporations functioning under a direct democracy principle are never found among widely 
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can very well expect professional management teams to run the business in 
whole or in part even when shareholders make a sophisticated and skilled 
group of potential managers.209 
It could still be argued that The DAO only proves that executives and 
managers will continue to be needed, but not that the board will necessarily 
survive or preserve its role, provided that in The DAO’s organization, the 
management function was performed by a single body, the curators, and not 
by the usual two-tiered structure of a monitoring board overseeing 
management. This apparently unique organizational feature follows, 
however, from the ordinary separation of funds and managers that we 
typically witness in investment funds,210 whereby even if the fund has chosen 
an organizational form that does require a board of directors, the board has 
in any case a very limited role.211 The absence in The DAO of a board can 
hence be understood first and foremost by looking at the specific business 
(i.e., investment) that the organization undertook. It can also be explained 
considering that The DAO’s investors had unusual competence and skill to 
evaluate the organization’s business decisions and were thus able to perform 
with a higher than ordinary degree of expertise the monitoring function that 
is normally entrusted to the board. This, however, is not usually the case. 
Shareholders typically do not have the time and desire to engage in 
monitoring, nor they have the competence. Despite allegations to the 
contrary, neither directors nor officers are thus going to disappear.212 
 
held firms. See also id. at 797–98. Interestingly, a direct democracy corporation would 
resemble The DAO in many, if not all, respects. 
 209. It remains true, however, that “investors who are knowledgeable about business 
matters will typically delegate less control to managers than those who are uninformed.” Id. 
at 789. 
 210. See John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment 
Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 (2014). 
 211. The board structure is required for mutual funds by the Investment Company Act but 
the board’s monitoring role on behalf of the shareholders is rendered in practice almost 
irrelevant by the lack of shareholder activism and the fact that directors can “serve indefinitely 
without reelection” and “appoint many of their own replacements.” Id. at 1252. Hedge funds 
cannot fire the management company and often choose organizational forms that do not even 
mandate a board. Id. at 1232, 1253 (noting, at 1253, that “[t]o the extent that funds do have 
directors, it is typically because quirks of law in offshore jurisdictions require it.”). See also 
id. at 1255 (regarding private equity funds). See also id. at 1269–70 (with respect to closed-
end funds). 
 212. See Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 23–42 (challenging the view that 
corporate boards are going to become obsolete). See also Petrin, supra note 113, at 1025–29 
(providing an account of the view according to which decentralized organizations could make 
managers obsolete, but concluding, at 1028–29, that “[c]urrently, it seems more likely that 
technology will revolutionize and improve corporate management rather than lead to its 
demise.”). 
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Whether or not running a particular business requires mostly business 
skills or investment skills will tip the balance toward more or less 
shareholder empowerment and monitoring in the specific case—provided, 
however, that substantial modifications to the fundamental distribution of 
powers between shareholders, directors, and managers are generally 
unlikely. Adjustments may be introduced in the corporation’s governing 
documents, and reforms aimed at accommodating technological innovations 
may allow greater party autonomy in this respect. In such cases, this article 
suggests that the distinction between decisions that mostly involve business 
skills and decisions that mostly involve investment skills is a convenient 
place to draw the line. 
 
C. Corporate Management in the Twenty-First Century: A New 
Balance Between Strategic, Supervisory, and Executive Roles 
 
While blockchains and smart contracts might help modernize 
shareholder meetings, artificial intelligence and algorithms entail greater 
changes for managerial bodies.213 Recent examples of machine learning 
algorithms that provide recommendations and make decisions, such as 
VITAL or Watson, suggest that humans might not have a monopoly on 
managerial functions anymore. However, fully autonomous algorithmic 
entities or even fully algorithmic boards seem a more distant reality.  
Current artificial intelligence programs are still far from exhibiting the 
“general human-level intelligence” or “artificial general intelligence”214 that 
would enable them to adjust their decision-making processes to changing 
circumstances and to apply their “cognition” to a variety of different settings 
and contexts, as humans do. Moreover, the large amounts of relevant data 
that are necessary to run machine learning algorithms are not always 
available, and when they are, there is often a trade-off between access to 
wide public datasets and their meaningfulness and suitability for firm-
specific issues and decisions.215 This considerably restricts the number of 
firms that can effectively employ artificial intelligence for decision-making 
purposes, as well as the type of issues that can be tackled through automated 
decisions. Some companies may not have the resources to internally develop 
adequate technological tools, and when they use public data or buy them 
from third parties, they might not be able to put together appropriate inputs 
to run machine learning algorithms on idiosyncratic matters of the firm.216 
 
 213. See Möslein, supra note 21, at 656–57. 
 214. See, e.g., Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 89–90, 96. 
 215. Id. at 97–99. 
 216. Id. 
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These challenges make it hard to believe that fully autonomous boards 
or algorithmic entities will spread anytime soon, even in jurisdictions that 
seem to permit them already.217 In many other jurisdictions, there is the 
additional obstacle of statutory provisions that require the appointment of a 
board of directors comprising (natural) persons.218 Reforms are unlikely to 
be undertaken in this respect, at least until policy considerations regarding 
deterrence and accountability have been convincingly addressed for 
algorithmic management systems as well. 
 
1. Managerial Accountability in the Era of Artificial Intelligence 
 
Machine learning algorithms and other artificial intelligence tools do 
not respond to common incentives, only to programming instructions. 
Current systems of incentives and deterrence, which are tailored to human 
decision-makers, do not apply to algorithms.219 Significantly, broad 
standards of conduct, such as the notions of “diligence,” “due care,” or 
“loyalty,” are not intelligible for algorithms and cannot even be coded into 
programming language. These standards, and the liability rules that are built 
upon them, are inevitably made for human decision-makers. One can hardly 
see, for instance, how the business judgment rule—which protects directors 
and officers from second-guessing their business choices if they were not 
interested in the transaction, they were duly informed, and they exercised 
their judgment in the good faith effort to advance the corporation’s 
interests—could apply to artificial intelligence alone.220 Artificial 
intelligence may be unbiased and uninterested, but this actually depends on 
coding and programming instructions. The same is true with respect to the 
availability of the information that is necessary to make such decisions. 
Again, whether the algorithm is duly informed (i.e., it is working on the 
proper dataset for the task) depends on a programming choice. Finally, 
artificial intelligence cannot make any “good faith” effort to advance 
anyone’s interests.221 The very notion of good faith does not really make 
sense for algorithms. At most, it does for the flesh-and-blood people who 
programmed or ran the algorithm. This is because algorithms need well-
 
 217. See supra Part I.E and accompanying notes. 
 218. See, e.g., Möslein, supra note 21, at 664–65.  
 219. See id. at 651, 666–67. 
 220. See Petrin, supra note 113, at 1016. 
 221. See Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 108. 
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defined and specific functioning rules, not broad standards potentially 
subject to different interpretations.222 
Strictly speaking, algorithms cannot even be held accountable if they 
provide bad recommendations or make wrong decisions.223 They cannot pay 
damages or make amends. Instead, legal entities (such as the company 
producing or using the algorithm) and the people running them are needed 
to enforce any liquidation of damages.224 As a result, human decision-makers 
continue to provide crucial accountability when it comes to employing 
technology for managerial purposes, which the law will not easily abandon 
without valid alternatives. 
 
2. The Impact of Technology on Organizational Charts and on the Role 
of the Board 
 
The impact of artificial intelligence on high-level managerial functions 
may then be better appreciated considering that it will most likely 
complement, rather than substitute, corporate directors and officers. Besides 
accountability, the reason is that most of the tasks that corporate executives 
and directors carry out which often involve situational judgment, flexibility, 
adaptability, and communication skills are not readily replicable by 
 
 222. Cf. Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 695 
(2017). A similar point has been raised with respect to algorithmic management and the 
pursuit of corporate purposes. Algorithms “optimize a given goal function” and they do so 
incredibly effectively. The use of artificial intelligence in decision-making thus “carries the 
risk that extremely one-sided goals will be pursued with utmost effectiveness.” Armour & 
Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 108–09. Significantly, algorithms do not work well with the 
broad corporate goals or purposes that often guide managerial decisions today, which may 
require the balancing of different considerations and interests. Corporate goals must instead 
be somehow quantifiable and measurable in terms of outcome variables. This in turn “may 
exacerbate a more general tendency to focus excessively on factors it is possible to quantify 
such as stock prices.” Id. at 101. See also Petrin, supra note 113, at 1020–22 (arguing that, 
unlike human managers, artificial intelligence could work toward more than one goal at the 
same time). 
 223. See Gramitto Ricci, supra note 16, passim. 
 224. The problem of accountability becomes immediately apparent if one thinks of a fully 
autonomous algorithmic entity with no human decision-makers and possibly no human 
members (see supra Part I.E). Managerial liability or piercing the corporate veil would not be 
an option and the only way to recover damages would necessarily depend upon whether the 
self-driving corporation actually had sufficient assets on its own to ensure damage 
compensation. Several solutions have been discussed, such as registration or capital 
requirements, imposing liability on artificial intelligence providers or strict liability on 
corporations that make use of artificial intelligence, mandatory insurance, etc. On all of these 
aspects, see Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 107–08, 110–13. See also Petrin, 
supra note 113, at 1013–18. 
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computers.225 With this in mind, one can expect that algorithms will 
streamline and simplify decision-making structures and apparatuses to a 
considerable extent but not entirely automate them, at least for the majority 
of firms. 
Directors and officers make decisions after company employees 
perform complex inquiries and fact-finding activities, which often involve 
information gathering and processing, as well as advice from external 
experts, advisors, and counsel. It is precisely in relation to these inquiries, 
preliminary investigations, and advisory services that artificial intelligence 
can provide its greatest contribution.226 Artificial intelligence can offer 
valuable informative support by analyzing large amounts of data, finding 
correlations and patterns in the datasets, and identifying profitable business 
strategies and solutions. It may be argued, though, that this is not a new 
discovery at all. The consequences for corporations may, however, be 
profound. Not only might demand for external advisory services diminish, 
but the number of company employees dedicated to these preliminary 
activities might drop.227 Automation of these operating tasks suggests that 
some lower-level managers and employees might disappear from future 
organizational charts, leaving a good deal of work to the machines.228 
Competences that have commonly been delegated to executive officers 
and managers because of the need for particular operating expertise might 
 
 225. Corporate directors and officers perform, in fact, a variety of cognitive nonroutine 
tasks, involving situational judgment, problem-solving skills, complex communications, 
flexibility and creativity, which cannot be translated into a comprehensive and exhaustive set 
of rules to be coded in a computer software. With respect to both cognitive and manual 
nonroutine tasks, computers typically complement, rather than substitute, human labor. See 
David H. Autor, Frank Levy & Richard J. Murnane, The Skill Content of Recent 
Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1279 (2003) (drawing the 
distinction between routine and nonroutine tasks and showing that computers can more easily 
substitute workers that carry out the first, but instead typically complement workers that 
mostly perform the second). 
 226. Information gathering and processing generally involve routine tasks and are, in fact, 
easier to automate. See Autor, Levy & Murnane, supra note 225, at 1284–85. See also Autor, 
supra note 62, at 143; Agrawal, Gans & Goldfarb, supra note 6, at 16. 
 227. See generally Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 90, 103 (observing that the 
use of artificial intelligence will likely mean that fewer people are needed to perform the same 
tasks, that new decisions will become important, and that agency costs will increasingly relate 
to fewer strategic areas). 
 228. See supra notes 221 and 225. See also Petrin, supra note 113, at 971–72, 980, 983–
96 (distinguishing between administrative managerial tasks and non-administrative judgment 
work, and arguing that the former is more susceptible to be completely taken over by artificial 
intelligence, but that in the future even the latter might be performed to some extent by 
technology). But see Rogers, supra note 5, at 553–54 (arguing that automation mostly 
concerns tasks, not full jobs). 
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also be automated or shift back to the board of directors (or to inside 
directors), due to the informational decision-making support provided by 
technological tools.229 Directors might be more willing to undertake some 
higher-level operating responsibilities too, if they can easily obtain the 
advice and information necessary for the task, and the time and effort that it 
entails are cut down by automation. 
To be sure, modern boards are mostly made up of independent directors 
who monitor by relying on the information flows put in place by company 
executives and especially on increased firm-specific public disclosure and 
market prices.230 They are thus not necessarily more knowledgeable than 
investors when it comes to firm-specific information.231 However, with the 
additional data, advice, and support provided by artificial intelligence they 
could become more involved in strategic and operating decisions. Greater 
availability of decision-making tools not only strengthens the decision-
making role of executive board members, to the detriment of lower-level 
company employees, but it also enables the board as a whole to embrace new 
responsibilities. Compared to shareholders, outside independent directors 
retain, after all, the advantage of greater expertise and more frequent 
interaction with senior management. This makes it easy to predict greater 
board involvement in company policies and strategies and perhaps even in 
important operating decisions. Changes in board composition to recruit 





 229. A conceptually similar prediction has been advanced by Martin Petrin, according to 
whom artificial intelligence will likely lead to “fused management”: the abolishment of the 
prevailing two-tiered structure of corporate governance (whereby the board supervises 
delegated officers and managers) in favor of an all-encompassing management body, 
combining functions and tasks that are currently performed by the board and by managers. 
See Petrin, supra note 113, at 1006–08. 
 230. See Gordon, supra note 133, at 1473–1500, 1541–63. 
 231. Evidence shows, however, that they are generally more knowledgeable than 
investors, provided that when they trade on the company’s stock, they typically outperform 
the market. See Enrichetta Ravina & Paola Sapienza, What Do Independent Directors Know? 
Evidence from Their Trading, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 962 (2010). 
 232. See Hamdani et al., supra note 178, at 230. On the need to adapt board composition 
and director competence to the opportunities and challenges opened up by technology, see 
Niccolò Abriani, La corporate governance nell’era dell’algoritmo. Prolegomeni a uno studio 
sull’impatto dell’intelligenza artificiale sulla corporate governance, 2020 IL NUOVO DIRITTO 
DELLE SOCIETÀ 261, 272–74 (predicting that, in the future, corporate boards could have fewer, 
more business-oriented members). 
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a. The Gig Economy, the Changing Role of Production Workers, and 
the Disappearance of Middle Managers 
 
While artificial intelligence will likely strengthen the highest levels of 
the organizational chart, the case of middle-level and line-level workers is 
partly different. Different technologies come in to play, which do not 
necessarily involve data processing through artificial intelligence, but rather 
pure algorithmic supervision, management, and control. Algorithms can, in 
fact, also be used to monitor, organize, and handle internal processes of the 
firm.233 For instance, they may be employed to keep track of inventory 
material, handle customers’ orders, organize workers’ schedules, provide 
instructions to workers on how to perform their jobs, hire and lay off 
workers, and so forth. Robots equipped with sophisticated software may 
even physically execute some of these tasks, including moving items inside 
a warehouse or giving customers their change back. Some of these 
technologies affecting the workforce have already been adopted in large 
corporate organizations. The observed result is a contraction in the number 
of certain low- and middle-skilled workers, whose jobs can be performed 
quite well by technology.234 As innovations advance, these effects may move 
up the ladder and affect higher-skilled workers as well.235 The ongoing 
technological improvements thus raise the more general question of the 
actual extent of technologically induced corporate reorganization processes. 
Just as not all cognitive and decision-making functions that corporate 
directors and officers perform can be fully substituted by technology, not all 
manual tasks can be effectively automated.236 There is still room for workers 
 
 233. See generally Sarah O’Connor, When your boss is an algorithm, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 8, 
2016), https://www.ft.com/content/88fdc58e-754f-11e6-b60a-de4532d5ea35. 
 234. See, e.g., John Armour et al., Putting technology to good use for society: the role of 
corporate, competition and tax law, 6 J. BRIT. ACAD. 285, 305 (2018). 
 235. See generally Autor, supra note 62, at 149 (observing that “the occupations that are 
losing share appear to be increasingly drawn from higher ranks of the occupational 
distribution.”). See also Petrin, supra note 113, at 1002–03 (predicting that technological 
development will lead to “fused boards” with fewer members, since artificial intelligence will 
perform the role previously attributed to some of them). 
 236. More specifically, only routine manual tasks, which can be deterministically 
specified in a precise and unambiguous set of rules (e.g., moving an object from one side of 
a room to the other), are easy to automate through computers. The same is true for routine 
cognitive tasks (e.g., making calculations), which can also be easily automated. By contrast, 
nonroutine tasks, which include both manual and cognitive activities that humans can perform 
but whose rules are not sufficiently well understood to be specified in explicit terms, are much 
more resistant to automation. Examples of these activities include cooking, serving food, and 
personal care assistance, which may require complex communication abilities, situational 
judgment and problem-solving skills, as well as manual dexterity. Autor, Levy & Murnane, 
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who cook, operate storage systems, perform maintenance services or come 
into contact with customers. Nevertheless, while in highly hierarchical 
organizations with strong labor unions and job stability (like mid-twentieth 
century corporations), every employee is partly a manager (in the sense that 
she can program, administer and manage her own effort and work, including 
training),237 this is no longer the case when algorithmic management systems 
control workers’ hires, schedules and performance.238 Not only does this 
technology make it is easier to automate some managerial tasks, but it also 
makes it efficient to divest most production workers of the discretion they 
had in administering their own skills. As a result, these workers are 
increasingly confined to purely production roles.239 
In some cases, algorithmic management systems not only reduce 
workers’ discretion but go so far as to deprive them of their status as 
employees, turning them into subcontractors. Provided that various 
technologies enable firms to precisely measure, monitor, and supervise work 
performance240 even at a distance and for complex activities, the boundary 
between employees and independent contractors has often started to 
disappear.241  
The gig economy is a powerful example of both forces, as companies 
in this realm were early adopters of algorithmic management techniques. 
Indeed, the very expression gig economy refers to economic activities carried 
out by employing a workforce that mostly performs “gigs,” “tasks,” and not 
actual “work.”242 This is partly because workers are often split among 
different jobs and thus devote to the “gig” only limited time,243 and partly 
 
supra note 225; Autor, supra note 62; also cited by Rogers, supra note 5, at 554, 559–61 (also 
providing examples of the shortcomings of robots at performing manual tasks). 
 237. Daniel Markovits, How McKinsey Destroyed the Middle Class, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 
3, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/how-mckinsey-destroyed-midd 
le-class/605878/. 
 238. For the definition of algorithmic management, as used in this paragraph, see supra 
note 110. 
 239. I am grateful to Daniel Markovits for these observations. 
 240. See Rogers, supra note 5, at 562–63 (describing various technologies that enable 
companies to measure and quantify different aspects of work, process the collected data, and 
base managerial decisions upon them). 
 241. See, e.g., id. at 549–50, 569–73 (discussing and providing examples of technology-
enabled fissuring). 
 242. See Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the Just-in-Time Workforce: On-Demand Work, 
Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the Gig-Economy, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 
477–78 (2016). 
 243. For example, according to a survey, in 2014 and 2015 most Uber drivers had other 
jobs in addition to partnering with Uber. More specifically, in 2014, about 31% of the polled 
drivers worked full time at another job, 30% had another part-time job in addition to 
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because even full-time workers typically repeat the same tasks and 
assignments (the same “gigs”) over and over again. Famous examples of gig 
economy companies are Amazon, Uber, and Deliveroo. With some 
necessary distinctions, all of these companies use algorithms, platforms, 
apps, location trackers, scanners, and other technologies to manage and 
monitor their workforce. 
Amazon uses algorithms, sensors, and other technologies to monitor 
warehouse employees in many different respects. The company patented the 
technology for a wristband that, if implemented, would allow even stricter 
monitoring on workers, including, for instance, how employees carry out 
specific tasks, when they take breaks, how long the break is, how they place 
and move items within the warehouse, and so forth.244 Significantly, Amazon 
also sponsored a contest for robots to pick items off of warehouse shelves, 
but since humans still appear to be better at the task, the company limited 
itself to using robots that bring the shelves to the employee instead of 
employing fully robotic arms.245 
Uber uses an algorithm to match drivers with customers.246 Drivers use 
their app to signal availability, accept rides, and obtain payment. The app 
suggests to the driver the preferred route to the destination and enables Uber 
to monitor the driver’s performance. If the driver receives low customer 
ratings, refuses too many rides, or underperforms in other respects, Uber can 
simply refuse the driver access to the platform. 
Similarly, Deliveroo uses an algorithm to handle riders’ schedules and 
match each rider to a set of deliveries or a geographic area. Algorithms and 
apps enable the company to monitor the riders’ performance, including how 
many deliveries they complete, how long each delivery took, whether it was 
 
partnering with Uber, and roughly 38% worked for the company full time. By 2015, these 
percentages had changed to 52% (drivers working full time at another job), 14% (drivers 
working part time at another job), 33% (drivers working full time for Uber). Jonathan V. Hall 
& Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United 
States 10, 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22843, 2016), https:// 
www.nber.org/papers/w22843.pdf. 
 244. Ceylan Yeginsu, If Workers Slack Off, the Wristband Will Know. (And Amazon Has 
a Patent for It.), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/ 
technology/amazon-wristband-tracking-privacy.html. 
 245. Noam Scheiber, Inside an Amazon Warehouse, Robots’ Ways Rub Off on Humans, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/business/economy/ama 
zon-warehouse-labor-robots.html (describing the operation of Amazon’s Staten Island 
warehouse); Jason Del Rey, How robots are transforming Amazon warehouse jobs—for better 
and worse, VOX (Dec. 11, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/12/11/ 
20982652/robots-amazon-warehouse-jobs-automation.  
 246. See Lee et al., supra note 110 (discussing the main features of the algorithmic 
management systems employed by Uber and Lyft to provide ride-sharing services). 
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concluded within the estimated time frame, whether the rider refused 
deliveries, and so on.247 
In many cases, an immediately noticeable consequence of the use of 
these technologies is the rearrangement of the workforce between employees 
and independent contractors. Gig economy companies tend not to employ 
their workers but to rely on a wide network of independent contractors248 
who formally retain the power to decide when and how to work, such as 
whether to accept a ride or a delivery, but are in practice monitored, 
controlled, and directed as if they were employees.249 This phenomenon is 
known as “fissuring.”250 While fissuring also includes cases in which firms 
actually externalize functions to subcontractors or franchisees, it has brought 
about pressing calls for labor law reform when it involves a misclassification 
of employees as independent contractors, as often happens in the gig 
economy.251 
Another noteworthy consequence is that these companies enable a 
modern form of “Taylorism”252 by breaking down complex activities into 
different tasks that can either be automated or allocated to low-skilled labor 
and often try to control working environments such as Amazon’s warehouses 
in order to reduce the need for human flexibility and adaptability.253 This has 
progressively led to the downsizing, if not disappearance, of middle-class 
workers.254 To be sure, other forces are at play in scaling back the role of 
middle-class workers within corporate organizations,255 but technology is 
speeding up the process as workers no longer enjoy discretion on how to 
perform their tasks. Technology has increased the distance between actual 
managers and production workers in the content of their assignments. Fewer 
managers manage, with the help of technology.256 The rest perform simple, 
repetitive tasks. The work is broken down into a collection of different gigs, 
which enables greater standardization and the adoption of internal 
 
 247. O’Connor, supra note 233. 
 248. E.g., De Stefano, supra note 242, at 478. 
 249. Id. at 491–92, 498. 
 250. See generally DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO 
BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014). 
 251. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 5, at 569–70, 578. 
 252. See id. at 541, 553 (on “digital Taylorism”). See also O’Connor, supra note 233. 
 253. Autor, supra note 62, at 155–58. 
 254. See id. at 134–42 (showing that computerization of routine jobs has contributed to 
employment polarization in the United States). 
 255. Cf., e.g., Markovits, supra note 237.  
 256. See Lee et al., supra note 110, at 1603 (observing, with respect to ride-sharing 
services such as Uber and Lyft, that “[a]lgorithmic management allows a few human 
managers in each city to oversee hundreds and thousands of drivers on a global scale.”). 
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procedures and rules aimed at making humans and machines work together 
in a more coordinated fashion. 
Among middle-class workers, the contraction of middle managers is 
probably the most pronounced effect. As the examples of Uber and 
Deliveroo show, in the gig economy algorithms essentially perform, with 
limited or no human supervision, two purely managerial functions that have 
been historically attributed to middle management:257 (i) hiring and layoff 
decisions, as well as workers’ schedules;258 and (ii) monitoring workers’ 
performance.259 With the spread of these technologies, we can also expect a 
contraction of middle management in companies that operate in a more 
“traditional” way. This will have significant implications for corporate law 
and governance. Fewer upper-level managers and executives can directly 
manage and monitor a greater fraction of the workforce and will be 
increasingly called upon to make pivotal decisions. As decision-making 
power becomes more concentrated, responsibility and salary260 follow,261 
indicating that human decision-makers must pay close attention to 
organizational and technological adequacy, information flows, and internal 
monitoring systems. 
 
3. New (Strategic) Choices for Directors and Managers 
 
The extent of these technologically induced changes will be largely 
determined by how directors and executives, in their respective roles, will 
tackle certain emerging tech-governance issues,262 including those that some 
scholars have named “CorpTech governance”263 or “data governance.”264 
These involve, first and foremost, the fundamental choice of whether the 
company should rely on technology and to what extent, as well as the 
challenge of adapting the company’s business model to the opportunities and 
 
 257. Cf. Rogers, supra note 5, at 563 (observing that the tasks that algorithmic 
management systems automate are mostly managerial, such as “screening of resumés, 
inventory tracking and ordering, scheduling, workflow organization, oversight, payroll 
processing, etc.”). 
 258. See id. at 564–67 (discussing algorithmic hiring and scheduling).  
 259. See id. at 567–69 (discussing algorithmic monitoring and tasking). 
 260. On the rising incomes of highly skilled workers, including company executives, see 
Autor, supra note 62, at 142–44; Markovits, supra note 237. 
 261. Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 90–91, 103–04. 
 262. Technology and IT have traditionally fallen within the remit of officers and 
managers, but board involvement is gaining traction. Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 
44–45. 
 263. See id. passim. 
 264. See Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 90–91, 99–105. 
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possibilities opened up by technology. Some commentators have advocated 
for radical changes in corporate governance, such as the abandonment of 
hierarchical organizational structures in favor of a shift toward platform 
governance265 or an “ecosystem” model of organization.266 Radical 
upheavals of corporate governance models seem unlikely to become 
widespread, especially outside of the technology sector or the “platform 
business.”267 Nevertheless, all companies could, to a greater or lesser extent, 
adjust their business models to make use of blockchains and smart contracts 
or take advantage of big data and artificial intelligence applications.  
BMW is an interesting example in this regard. Despite its complex, 
hierarchical organizational structure, it not only embeds new technologies in 
its cars, but it also uses big data analytics and artificial intelligence for many 
purposes, including the design, engineering, and production of its vehicles 
and consumer support services.268 Variations can be expected across firms 
and industries, but embracing technology is becoming increasingly a matter 
of survival for companies. 
Most likely, then, the main organizational choice will actually be which 
corporate functions or jobs should be enhanced or assisted by technology and 
how this should happen, with possible repercussions on workforce 
distribution. For corporate executives, however, the key decision will likely 
concern whether to use artificial intelligence at all and, if so, how to put 
together sufficiently large sets of relevant data.  
Data might be publicly available or bought by third parties but using 
data analytics based on third-party technology may be helpful only for 
general inquiries and not for idiosyncratic problems of the firm.269 The same 
is true for machine learning and other artificially intelligent algorithms. The 
technology is usually available for sale, but it generally does not target most 
corporations’ specific needs. Corporate directors and managers will thus 
 
 265. See Fenwick, McCahery & Vermeulen, supra note 30 (arguing that current corporate 
governance models are failing businesses operating as platforms and suggesting a shift toward 
“platform governance”). 
 266. Mark Fenwick & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The End of the Corporation 10-26 
(European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Law Working Paper No. 482/2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3472601. 
 267. This includes technology firms such as Facebook or Amazon, whose core business 
is to provide a platform that connects different users for different purposes. A possible 
classification distinguishes, for instance, between social platforms (e.g., Facebook), exchange 
platforms (e.g., Amazon), content platforms (e.g., YouTube), software platforms (e.g., Apple 
iOS), and blockchain platforms (e.g., Ethereum). See Fenwick, McCahery & Vermeulen, 
supra note 30, at 175, 177; Fenwick & Vermeulen, supra note 266, at 13. 
 268. Marr, supra note 12. 
 269. Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 97–99. 
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have to decide whether it makes economic sense to buy algorithmic 
technology and data or whether it is better to produce one or the other, or 
even both, in house.270 In the latter case, proprietary algorithms running on 
proprietary datasets might require a restructuring of the “data architecture” 
of the firm—namely, ensuring that the company has in place adequate 
procedures to make available to the corporation’s decision-making bodies 
and their technological decision-making aids a large quantity of internal data 
obtained from customers, suppliers, and so forth.271 Clearly, the judgment on 
the opportunity and financial feasibility of such an investment rests with 
corporate management, as does the responsibility for compliance with 
privacy laws and regulations.  
More generally, current organizational structures need to be adjusted to 
identify where artificial intelligence and algorithms should be used, to 
acquire from outside the firm the necessary expertise, to train employees and 
managers, even at senior levels, and to provide incentives for the proper 
deployment of technological aids.272 
 
4. Tech Committees, Technological Risks, and Monitoring 
 
Algorithmic decision-making is not without its hazards. Even though 
algorithms are said to be impartial, unbiased, and not subject to distorted 
incentives,273 they might produce unbalanced results in practice. To be sure, 
when this happens it is usually because of biased instructions or data at the 
outset.274 Nevertheless, these problems might be difficult to overcome. 
Continuous monitoring and supervision of the activities performed in whole 
or in part through artificial intelligence hence becomes critical to ensure 
quality. 
 
 270. Cf. id. (also observing that the option of training artificial intelligence on proprietary 
data is available especially to larger firms). 
 271. See id. at 99–100. 
 272. Id. at 101–03. 
 273. See, e.g., Hamdani et al., supra note 178, at 229. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, 
Algorithms, Correcting Biases, 86 SOC. RES. 499 (2019) (showing that algorithms can actually 
help correct human biases).  
 274. See, e.g., Surden, supra note 60, at 105–07 (discussing the limitations of machine 
learning programs); Kroll et al., supra note 222, at 680–82 (providing examples of situations 
in which algorithmic decision-making may produce biased, discriminatory, and unfair 
results); Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 24–25, 30–31; Petrin, supra note 113, at 
1005–06 (explaining that algorithms are vulnerable to programmers’ inherent biases). 
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Monitoring the deployment of artificial intelligence falls under the 
responsibility of directors and officers.275 When artificial intelligence 
performs tasks that humans already do well, they have a duty to oversee the 
result. Even in situations where outcomes are not clear or where artificial 
intelligence performs tasks that humans are not able to do quite as well, such 
as when algorithms provide advice and recommendations based on big data, 
directors and officers maintain a duty to critically evaluate them. The focus 
of the supervision shifts, however, more toward procedural aspects, such as 
how the data were assembled or how the code was written.276 
To accommodate these new monitoring functions, corporate directors 
and officers might need to acquire greater technical knowledge and 
expertise.277 According to some commentators, we will see the rise of “tech 
committees” in charge of overseeing technological governance 
arrangements.278 Importantly, tech committees may also be entrusted with 
the task of evaluating and managing the technological risks posed by 
innovation.279 Imagine a corporation that provides personalized financial 
advice through a proprietary machine-learning algorithm developed in 
house. Shortcomings in the algorithm’s coding or in the criteria to assemble 
the data might expose the corporation to significant liability risks. The 
identification, evaluation, monitoring, and management of those risks 
requires special knowledge regarding how the algorithm works, how coding 
instructions are or should be written, how the datasets have been put together, 
and so forth. The board of directors should be qualified accordingly, through 
its members or an ad hoc tech committee, and should ensure the presence 
 
 275. See Möslein, supra note 21, at 659–60; Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 
101–03; Petrin, supra note 113, at 1013–15. 
 276. Significantly, human contribution is still important to extract value from big data. 
Big data analytics involves a multitude of activities on data—such as storage, extraction, 
filtering, refining, organization, etc.—that are necessary to extract knowledge from them and 
require expertise and competence. See MAGGIOLINO, supra note 7, at 37–43, 51 (also 
observing that the results obtained through big data analytics may be critically evaluated and 
tested). See generally Kroll et al., supra note 222 (discussing ways to make algorithmic 
decision-making more accountable and reviewable ex post). 
 277. Armour & Eindenmüller, supra note 57, at 102, 105, 115; Möslein, supra note 21, at 
660. 
 278. See Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 45–47. See also Armour & Eindenmüller, 
supra note 57, at 102–03, 115 (supporting the establishment of board committees dedicated 
to data governance issues). 
 279. See Agrawal, Gans & Goldfarb, supra note 6, at 18–20 (providing examples of risks 
posed by the use of artificial intelligence, including liability risks). Possible areas of oversight 
include the conflicts of interest inherent in the use of technology for governance purposes. 
With respect to these conflicts, see Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 31, 42.  
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within the corporation of officers, managers, and other employees with the 
necessary expertise.  
This and other similar examples are not science fiction but have already 
made the front pages of newspapers. IBM, for instance, came under the 
spotlight when it was discovered that its Watson program for oncology, 
which had been promoted to hospitals and physicians all over the world, was 
giving erroneous cancer treatment advice280 and that it had been benched by 
one of the hospitals that had been using it, the University of Texas MD 
Anderson Cancer Center.281 Apparently, the program had been trained on a 
limited dataset of hypothetical cases and not on real patients’ data; its 
recommendations thus deviated from approved guidelines.282 Although no 
patients were harmed by the incorrect therapeutic treatments suggested by 
the program, this case sheds light on the need to maintain control over 
artificial intelligence products and applications, as well as the liability risks 
that the (mis)use of big data and artificial intelligence can create. 
Significantly, these risks which often involve privacy considerations, have 
given rise to dedicated corporate functions that check compliance with the 
applicable laws and regulations.  
 
5. Corporate Reporting, Compliance, and Information Flows 
 
Monitoring of technological risks is key not only for those enterprises 
whose business involves providing technological services, as in the 
examples above, but also for corporations that offer non-technological goods 
and services but still employ technology as a governance and management 
tool.283  
The board of directors is generally responsible for implementing 
appropriate and effective governance practices, structures, and models. 
Incorrect use of technological tools that is associated with, or determines, 
organizational shortcomings ultimately falls under its purview when things 
 
 280. Casey Ross & Ike Swetlitz, IBM’s Watson supercomputer recommended ‘unsafe and 
incorrect’ cancer treatments, internal documents show, STATNEWS (July 25, 2018), https:// 
www.statnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/IBMs-Watson-recommended-unsafe-and-
incorrect-cancer-treatments-STAT.pdf.  
 281. Matthew Herper, MD Anderson Benches IBM Watson In Setback For Artificial 
Intelligence In Medicine, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2017, 3:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
matthewherper/2017/02/19/md-anderson-benches-ibm-watson-in-setback-for-artificial-intel 
ligence-in-medicine/#400d26ae3774.  
 282. Ross & Swetlitz, supra note 280. 
 283. See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and 
Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669 (2010) (discussing technological compliance 
and risk management systems and their possible shortcomings). 
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go wrong. A significant example is the deployment of technology for 
accounting and reporting purposes. Since corporate reporting is the 
responsibility of directors and managers, if they decide to shift to blockchain 
accounting, at least some of them should know how to operate blockchains 
and smart contracts and how to oversee them, and they may be required to 
obtain specific training for that purpose.284  
The same is true when technology is used to automate corporate 
procedures or as a tracking and monitoring device. Corporate management 
retains the duty to ensure that automated tasks are performed properly and 
that corporate processes driven by new technologies are able to raise warning 
signs or circle anomalies when these happen. Ultimately, these and similar 
responsibilities fall under the general duty of care with which corporate 
directors and officers must comply at all times. The innovation, as a matter 
of fact, is not that great. 
A final observation is warranted regarding how technology might 
enhance and strengthen directors’ monitoring role. Nonexecutive and 
independent directors typically obtain information regarding corporate 
affairs through reports and statements prepared by executive officers,285 who 
may have a seat on the board or simply come to inform the board of their 
activities.286 Direct access to corporate documents and information by non-
executives is often impractical and may even disrupt corporate operations,287 
especially if such access was unplanned. Accordingly, corporations rely on 
information flows that from the lowest level of the organizational chart reach 
the board of directors through company executives. The board’s dependence 
on the information flows organized by management creates, however, a 
number of problems, including the possibility that corporate management 
presents the information in a biased or unduly favorable way or refrains from 
providing information to avoid stricter monitoring.288 Technology may help 
safeguard the need to ensure systematic and methodic controls without 
disrupting or obstructing corporate operations by granting more direct access 
 
 284. Dai & Vasarhelyi, supra note 84, at 17. 
 285. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 138, at 143–44; MACEY, supra note 131, at 96; 
Bainbridge, supra note 135, at 284. 
 286. At least some executive officers have a seat on the board, although the number of 
executives also serving as directors has decreased over time. Compare EISENBERG, supra note 
138, at 145 (writing, in 1976, that “a substantial number of seats are held by executives 
themselves”), with MACEY, supra note 131, at 55 (observing, in 2008, that corporate insiders 
have very few seats on the boards of U.S. companies). On such changes in board composition, 
see Gordon, supra note 133, at 1472–76 (providing data on the rise of independent directors). 
 287. Cf. MACEY, supra note 131, at 96. 
 288. Id. at 56, 60–61; Bainbridge, supra note 135, at 284. 
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to information to non-executive and independent directors.289 Advancements 
in cryptography and the adoption of blockchains and smart contracts may 
encourage direct access to corporate documents by people at different levels 
of the organizational chart, including non-executive directors. This might 
improve reporting systems and facilitate supervision, making board 
members less dependent on the information flows received from company 
executives and officers. The monitoring role of the board of directors may 
thus be strengthened as a result. 
 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Three main policy implications follow from this analysis. The first is 
the need to preserve the ability of corporations to design their own tech 
governance structures and to balance the allocation of powers between 
different corporate constituencies accordingly. The potential benefits and 
costs of using technology to empower different corporate constituencies vary 
based on the idiosyncratic features of the firm. Therefore, the general 
recommendation put forward by principal-cost theory to permit a range of 
governance structures and refrain from direct regulation of the allocation of 
control rights290 also remains valid in the context of technology-driven 
corporate governance changes.291 For instance, the benefits that technology-
based shareholder empowerment may bring for firms largely depend on the 
number and competence of the shareholders and on the heterogeneity of their 
preferences. While it might thus make sense to use blockchains and other 
technologies to ensure shareholder involvement in business decisions when 
shareholders have or may easily acquire the necessary expertise, as could be 
the case for companies with large institutional shareholdings,292 the same 
choice might be ill-advised in many other cases. This observation also 
counsels against the adoption of one-size-fits-all technology-driven 
corporate governance models that have been enthusiastically supported by 
some commentators,293 such as a general shift toward a collaborative 
 
 289. Abriani, supra note 232, at 273. But see Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 32 
(arguing that, “[s]o long as management retains control of the coding, data sources and 
algorithms used for reporting to a board,” technology will not improve information flows). 
 290. Goshen & Squire, supra note 24, 825–26, 828. 
 291. See Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 47–48. 
 292. Generally speaking, greater engagement and “collaboration” on the part of 
institutional investors could help firms acquire valuable expertise and knowledge. See Jill E. 
Fisch & Simone M. Sepe, Shareholder Collaboration, 98 TEX. L. REV. 863 (2020) (arguing 
that collaboration between insiders and institutional investors could be firm-value enhancing 
by aggregating the partial and complementary information in their possession).  
 293. See supra notes 265 and 266 and accompanying text. 
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“platform governance” structure. Platform governance might make sense for 
some but certainly not for all corporate enterprises. Each firm should thus be 
allowed to make distinctive choices with respect to technology and 
governance. 
There are, however, cases in which the adoption of new technologies 
should at least be encouraged by lawmakers. I am referring, in particular, to 
the use of blockchains and smart contracts to run virtual shareholder 
meetings. In some U.S. states virtual shareholder meetings are prohibited by 
provisions that require meetings to be held at a physical location.294 These 
limits have been often justified by invoking the shortcomings of older 
technologies, which do not quite provide a secure and effective forum for 
virtual discussion, information sharing, and voting. Today, blockchains and 
smart contracts nullify these limits, because they make it possible to almost 
fully replicate physical meetings in a virtual setting and have the additional 
advantage of solving some of the problems of traditional shareholder 
meetings, such as difficulties in shareholder identification, eligibility to vote, 
proxy issues, and vote counting. This leads to a second, narrower state law 
policy recommendation, which is to allow virtual shareholder meetings and 
remove all remaining regulatory barriers to that effect. 
Finally, as new technologies can strengthen the role of directors and 
officers and supplement management in numerous ways, corporations 
should be nudged to effectively manage and monitor their technological risks 
and opportunities—for instance, through establishing ad-hoc tech 
committees of the board and training programs on the use of new technology 
at the managerial level. As corporate law’s duty of care is a blunt weapon to 
obtain this result, a promising way forward is to introduce disclosure 
obligations on the internal tech governance arrangements adopted by 
corporations.295 These obligations need not be burdensome for disclosing 
companies, but could be crafted under a comply-or-explain approach, 
whereby only companies that have made a significant investment in 
technology for governance purposes would need to disclose which specific 
organizational controls and procedures they have put in place to that end. 
 
 294. As of 2019, 30 U.S. states permitted virtual-only shareholder meetings, 12 other 
states and the District of Columbia exclusively allowed hybrid meetings (meetings for which 
remote participation is allowed in connection to a physical gathering), and 8 remaining states 
required in-person meetings. See BROADRIDGE, VIRTUAL SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS. 2019 
FACTS AND FIGURES 3 (2020), https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/broadridge-virtual-
shareholder-meetings-2019-facts-and-figures.pdf. Additional constraints to virtual-only 
shareholder meetings may be set forth in company bylaws, even in states that explicitly allow 
them. 
 295. Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 16, at 49–50. 
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Such a disclosure obligation would enable greater public scrutiny on the use 





Common predictions regarding the impact of new technologies on 
corporations vary from forecasts of completely autonomous organizations 
run entirely by algorithms to more limited improvements and efficiencies in 
the workings of corporate bodies and procedures. This article has shown that, 
while technology probably has the potential to bring about both changes, the 
most significant and immediate impact will fall somewhere in between and 
will concern the distribution of powers and competences among corporate 
bodies. 
Twenty-first century technologies are much more capable than previous 
technologies to affect the fundamental determinants along which corporate 
law traditionally distributes power between shareholders, directors, and 
managers. They reduce collective decision-making costs, speed up and 
automate corporate procedures, ensure safer communications and more 
accurate reporting, and supplement business competence and skills. These 
advantages, collectively considered, may shift the balance on who is, on a 
specific matter, the best decision-maker within the corporation.  
Shareholders, especially if knowledgeable in business matters, might 
come out strengthened from the technological revolution. While it is unlikely 
that they will remove directors and managers from their roles, they might 
demand greater involvement in business decisions or more direct access to 
documents and information for monitoring purposes. The board of directors 
might, instead, be strengthened in its monitoring and policy-making 
function, while relying somewhat more on shareholders’ indications for 
business decisions and on new technologies for advice, recommendations, 
and inquiries, to the detriment of external advisors and lower-level managers 
and employees.  
Although technologically induced changes will likely be firm-specific, 
the overall result will likely streamline organizational charts and more so 
hybridize corporate roles and functions so that management, monitoring, and 
strategy-setting come closer together.296 Many of these changes are, in 
practice, enabled by corporate law default provisions that accommodate and 
embrace technological change. The DAO constitutes, after all, a remarkable 
example of how contract law can adapt technology to business (or, perhaps, 
 
 296. Cf. Fenwick & Vermeulen, supra note 39, at 13. 
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make a business out of a technology) and of the risks and challenges that this 
entails. The issue then becomes to what extent the law should welcome and 
meet these new demands. 
 
